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The Chief of Naval Operations’ (CNO’s) annual Title 10 War Game (also known as Global) 
conducted at the Naval War College (NWC) has become a primary venue for exploring emerging 
concepts. This year’s effort is a continuation of the NWC War Gaming Department’s 
examination of the Air-Sea Battle (ASB) concept. The 2012 Global War Game concluded that 
current command and control (C2) structures at the operational level of war may be inadequate 
to effectively execute cross-domain operations as envisioned by the concept. While the ASB 
concept outlines the need to command and control ‘cross-domain operations’ which are joint, 
networked and integrated, no organizational structure is proposed. The concept only suggests 
that any suitable structure must be capable of tight, real-time coordination. 
At the direction of the CNO and the ASB Office, the 2013 Global War Game explored the C2 
of combined forces while executing cross-domain operations in a high-intensity Anti-
Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) environment. This event followed two workshops conducted 
earlier in the year: a C2 Requirements Workshop held in the spring and a C2 Options 
Workshop held in the early summer. The results of both events informed the design and 
development of the capstone event. 
The 2013 Global War Game was conducted in September and brought together 72 players, 39 
observers, and 19 flag officers and general officers from the joint and international community to 
examine and refine candidate C2 systems (consisting of both organizational structure and 
functional processes). Three candidate C2 systems were examined, consisting of a traditional 
model using functional component commanders, and two novel approaches developed during the 
C2 Options Workshop: one based on a “Domain Commander” and another based on a “Cross-
Domain Commander.” 
In order to address the mutually agreed upon objectives established by the ASB Office and the 
Naval War College, the following central research questions guided the design and development 
of the game: Which of the three candidate C2 systems is best suited to command and control 
combined forces engaged in cross-domain operations in a high-intensity A2/AD environment, 
and why? 
GAME DESIGN AND MECHANICS  
This one-sided, seminar style, scenario-based game divided players into one of three combined 
operational planning teams formed to support the geographic combatant commander of a 
fictional region. Within this region, tensions between the antagonistic Red and their regional 
neighbors continued to escalate over a series of four notional vignettes. These vignettes were 
used to help critically examine and drive improvements to the candidate C2 systems. Each 
planning team was assigned one of the three candidate C2 structures at the beginning of the 
event: Player review of these structures was guided by a common set of criteria which were 
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derived from the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) and Milan Vego’s Joint Operational 
Warfare Theory and Practice, and subsequently refined through the C2 Requirements Workshop 
and a Flag and General Officer Survey. The resulting criteria consisted of the following:  
? Unity of Effort  
? Flexibility  
? Simplicity  
? Resiliency  
? Operational Integration  
? Cross-Domain Synergy 
(See pages 30–31 of the full report for criteria definitions)  
In addition to identifying command relationships and authorities, each planning team examined 
how their respective C2 systems facilitated four key processes of interest:  
? Deliberate and dynamic targeting  
? Intelligence tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, analysis, production, 
dissemination and integration  
? Integrated air and missile defense  
? Sustainment  
Using the six criteria, players identified strengths and weaknesses of their C2 system. Based on 
the criteria-driven weaknesses identified, players then made initial changes to the structure 
(command nodes and authority links) and processes (roles and responsibilities) in order to 
mitigate weaknesses. Players then addressed a series of specific questions which highlighted 
particular challenges associated with each of the vignettes and incorporated additional changes, 
as needed. All participant-generated changes to the C2 system—along with the associated 
strengths and weaknesses—were captured in the game tool developed specifically for this event. 
At the end of each vignette, players completed individual surveys to assess the performance of 
their C2 system using the six criteria. 
Following the fourth vignette, players prepared their final C2 system brief for the Peer Review 
Plenary, as well as a brief for the participating flag and general officers (FOGOs) who attended the 
last two days of the event to demonstrate how their system evolved over the course of the game. 
During the Peer Review Plenary, the players received feedback regarding their systems and used 
Analytical Hierarchical Process (AHP) software to collectively weight the six criteria for use 
during the final plenary session. The players then reviewed the feedback they received and revised 
their C2 system brief accordingly. Similarly, after receiving presentations on the Global ’13 project 
and candidate C2 systems, the FOGOs collectively weighted the six criteria as well. 
During the final plenary, each team presented their final C2 system brief, which was followed by a 
brief question and answer session to clarify the functionality of these systems. Using the AHP 
software, both the players and FOGOs conducted individual pair-wise comparisons of the candidate 
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C2 systems using the weighted criteria established the day before. These results were used to 
stimulate a facilitated discussion regarding the C2 systems and their attributes. Web-IQ threaded-
discussion software and ethnographers were used to capture discussions during this session. 
RESULTING CANDIDATE C2 OPTIONS  
Option A: Domain Commanders 
Option A uses domains (maritime, air, land, space, and cyber) as its organizing principle. Domain 
commanders are responsible for gaining, maintaining, and exploiting access within their assigned 
domain and denying the enemy from doing the same. They exercise operational control (OPCON) 
over joint and combined forces rather than relying on support relationships between functional 
components. Forces are allocated based on the anticipated need to project power through given 
domains, the threats to forces operating in those domains, and the need to disrupt, destroy, and 
defeat those same domain threats. Cross-Domain Operations Centers located within each domain 
commander’s staff headquarters use Integrated Tasking Orders to provide direction to supporting 
Combined Joint Task Units (CJTU) and control/coordinating instructions for CJTUs from other 
domain commanders which are operating in the same physical domain (e.g., space deconfliction, 
water space management, fire control measures, etc.). The CJTU is a tailored, coalition force that 
includes multi-domain capabilities and has either a common mission or geographic focus. CJTUs 
provide the requisite C2 structure to enable assigned units to be effectively employed when 
adversary efforts degrade traditional reach-back communications paths. 
 
Figure 1: Option A Final C2 Structure 
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Option B: Cross-Domain Commanders 
Option B focuses on organizing joint effects under cross-domain commands which are 
subordinate to the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) and are tailored to execute their assigned 
line of operation in a particular campaign plan. Known as “Cross-Domain Commanders,” each 
sub JTF-level headquarters controls an array of joint capabilities and operates much like a mini-
CJTF. The independent nature of each Cross-Domain Commander allows them to operate 
autonomously, limited only by the extent of their authorities and the capabilities of their assigned 
forces. Individual Cross-Domain Commanders are empowered to task and organize their forces 
as required in response to changes in their assigned lines of operation and associated missions. 
All forces are either assigned OPCON to a Cross-Domain Commander or available for tasking 
directly by the CJTF. When additional theater assets or assets from outside the joint operating 
area are required by a Cross-Domain Commander, they are assigned under the tactical control 
(TACON) of the requesting commander. Shifting TACON of units among cross-domain 
Commanders as the situation dictates provides for flexibility as the campaign unfolds and 
operational requirements dictate. This system relies on functions and processes being delegated 
to the lowest level possible within the organization to enable their accomplishment when 
degraded communications inhibit guidance from above. 
 
Figure 2: Option B Final C2 Structure 
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Option C: Functional Commanders  
Option C evolved from a functional component commander approach, with changes incorporated 
to improve cross-domain operational effectiveness. Maritime, air, and land component 
headquarters were transformed into combined/joint organizations, and similar sub-CJTF 
component commanders for information warfare/dominance and logistics are incorporated to 
provide improved C2 in those areas. This model also incorporates the concept of utilizing CJTUs 
at the sub-functional component level to effectively leverage the capabilities of joint and 
combined forces in a specific area of operations, particularly when operating in a 
communications-challenged environment. Cross-domain effectiveness is further enhanced by 
implementing Cross-Domain Coordination Elements - sized and tailored appropriately - at the 
CJTF, functional component, and CJTU levels. 
COMPARISON OF OPTIONS 
The AHP results from the final plenary session indicate no clear consensus among either the 
players or the FOGOs for one of the three C2 options. As a group, the players demonstrated a 
slight preference for option B (Cross-Domain Commander Model), while the U.S. and coalition 
flag and general officer group indicated a slight preference for option A (Domain Commander 
Model). However, when separating their responses, it’s interesting to note that the U.S. Navy 
 
Figure 3: Option C Final C2 Structure 
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Flag Officer cohort preferred option C (Functional Commander Model), the Coalition FOGOs 
preferred option B, and the U.S. General Officer cohort preferred option A. Following analysis 
Based on the their feedback. 
RESULTING THEMES 
Post-game analysis of the various player and FOGO deliverables led to identification of the 
following six themes: 
Enhancing Unity of Effort through Mission Command and Authorities 
Global ’13 described three distinct ways to command and control the joint force in a high 
intensity A2/AD environment. In all cases, the importance of Mission Command and pushing 
authorities and commander’s intent to the lowest effective level was emphasized as a way of 
mitigating the effects of communications challenges. Because such challenges may force 
autonomous execution and decision making at lower levels, commanders will need the clarity of 
intent provided by mission orders. Mission orders must present a clear understanding of roles 
and missions among commanders at each level in the structure, prioritization among tasks and 
lines of effort, and clearly defined boundaries between domains. Poorly defined domains could 
create confusion for commanders issuing orders and tactical units attempting to operate from, 
create effects in, or even transit from one domain to another. 
In order to ensure that all execution decisions and apportionment requests remain aligned with 
the operation's mission and commander's intent, the joint force must commit to a culture of 
leadership that relies on decentralization and trust. This will require senior commanders to 
develop and clearly articulate their intent and guidance, and to trust that their tactical 
commanders will appropriately interpret and act upon their guidance, especially when degraded 
or denied communications may prevent the issuing of amplifying guidance. Senior commanders 
must be comfortable with not being able to directly control the outcome of a mission, but rather 
indirectly influence outcomes through clear intent and authorities. This trust must be earned 
through persistent engagement between leaders at all levels and a commitment to changing the 
culture of joint command and control. To be effective, tactical commanders must be able to 
quickly identify the likelihood that an event or action may occur, the potential impact it would 
have on mission accomplishment, and how much risk the operational commander is willing to 
accept for tactical success. Pushing mission orders and authorities to the lowest levels succeeds 
in an environment where leaders at all levels appreciate, encourage, and expect creativity and 
initiative. Exercises—and real-world operations—provide the venues to develop this trust 
through practice and experience. 
Improvements to Joint C2 Must Be Evolutionary, Vice Revolutionary 
Participants appeared reluctant to commit to any change that was radically different than what is 
in place today. While realizing the benefits and strengths inherent in each of three models, the 
vast majority of U.S. and coalition participants indicated that changes to current C2 structures 
and processes would have to occur at a deliberate, moderate pace if they are to succeed. Many of 
the coalition representatives highlighted that clear commander’s intent and guidance and pushing 
mission orders down to the lowest echelon would improve coalition integration, but that the pace 
and extent of change must be tempered and conducted in a way that enables coalition forces to 
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operationally integrate. As one coalition flag officer said, “If you go evolutionary, then we can 
follow; revolutionary, we can’t follow.” Players also recognized that integrating the 
characteristics of any XDO C2 system into today’s functional component-based model would 
require new ways of thinking about warfare, including the breaking down of service-specific 
cultural barriers. 
Cross-Domain Coordination and Control Elements 
All three C2 models incorporated some form of a cross-domain coordination or control cell to 
synchronize effects and mitigate resource shortfalls at the sub-CJTF/functional component 
commander level. This feature was developed to enhance cross-domain synergy and operational 
integration. Team A used their XDO Centers, which resided within each Domain Commander, to 
produce Integrated Tasking Orders to provide direction to subordinate Combined Joint Task 
Units (CJTU). They also provided control and coordinating instructions for CJTUs from other 
domain commanders that operate in the same physical domain (e.g. airspace deconfliction, water 
space management, fire control measures, etc.). Each XDO headquarters in Team B featured a 
Cross-Domain Operations and Intelligence Center (XDO/IC) to coordinate activities among 
XDO CDRs and synchronize with the XDO Board at the JTF level. Team C developed Cross-
Domain Coordination Elements (XDCE) at the CJTF and functional component headquarters to 
create and exploit greater knowledge and understanding across all domains within the area of 
operations. 
These elements would be manned with joint and coalition operators and planners from each 
domain and service that are educated and trained in planning and executing cross-domain 
operations. They would ultimately enhance knowledge and awareness of access and power 
projection requirements of each domain, and the associated capabilities required to do so. As one 
player noted, “Until we all do alternate tours as airmen, sailors, soldiers, marines, cyber and log 
specialists (and we would clearly never do it) we need to force together staffs—XDCEs—that 
truly co-join their staffs to achieve coordinated effects.” 
Information Warfare/Dominance Commander 
Establishing a commander solely responsible for information dominance was strongly supported 
by game participants. This standing organization would coordinate and integrate requirements 
and capabilities across the entire range of the information spectrum (cyber, space, EW, 
communications, intelligence, METOC, IO etc.) in order to support commanders’ domain access 
and power projection requirements, push appropriate authorities down to the lowest levels, and 
better affect the internal workings (processes, biases, etc.) of an adversary’s C2 system. One flag 
officer noted, “The integrated information command from Team C is an important and novel 
idea and the information environment will be a key feature in emerging forms of warfare.” 
Sustainment Commander/Task Force Sustainment  
The sustainment of forces will be a major challenge to gaining a competitive advantage over a 
highly capable adversary. Traveling from long distances, these forces will be highly vulnerable 
to advanced adversary A2/AD systems. Any C2 structure must be able to accommodate the flow 
of forces deployed from the United States and throughout the region. The C2 systems developed 
over the course of the game highlighted some potential ways to plan and execute sustainment 
U.S. Naval War College Global 2013 Report 
E-8 
operations in an A2/AD environment. A commander responsible solely for sustaining forces 
during the conflict was an emerging C2 concept that warrants further consideration. Such an 
organization would direct all elements of the supply and maintenance system “to deliver the right 
things to the right place at the right time to support the joint force commander and component 
commanders.” 
Combined Joint Task Units (CJTUs) 
Participants in all three cells strongly supported the concept of projecting power through 
combined units below the sub-CJTF/functional component level with forces from different 
services and countries that operate in different domains. These units could be tailored to any type 
of commander (domain, cross-domain, functional) based on mission, line of effort, domain or 
geographic orientation. These forces would need to be pre-integrated and trained prior to the start 
of conflict, which would enable them to self-synchronize and directly coordinate with each other 
in a degraded, denied, or hostile communications environment. The make-up of these units drew 
similar comparisons to a Marine Air Ground Task Force, Army Battalion Task Force, a Navy 
Battle Group or a Joint Special Operations Task Force. However, the tailored combination of 
mission/task-organized capabilities envisioned for a CJTU could include forces from all 
domains, including cyber and space. 
THE WAY AHEAD 
Because an evolutionary approach was viewed as the preferred method for improving current C2 
structures and processes, Global 2014 will explore how the four emerging C2 attributes 
(information warfare/dominance commander, sustainment commander, cross-domain 
coordination and control element, and combined joint task units) derived from Global 2013 could 
be integrated into the current functional component model of today. This effort will entail 
developing a hybrid C2 model which incorporates these attributes, along with a supporting XDO 
C2 Concept of Operations (CONOPS), and to then examine and refine the CONOPS in order to 
lay the foundation for future Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) development. 








STATEMENT OF SPONSOR’S INTEREST IN THIS TOPIC 
Based upon CNO’s area of interest, the Global 2013 project was developed to explore how the 
U.S. and its international partners could command and control forces executing cross-domain 
operations in future Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) environments. The results of this effort 
were designed to inform the development and refinement of a joint Cross- Domain Operations 
(XDO) Command and Control (C2) Concept of Operations (CONOPS). 
The Global 2013 Project consisted of an online C2 Requirements Workshop (development of C2 
criteria and conditions), a C2 Options Development Workshop (development of candidate C2 
systems) and the Capstone Event (examination of the candidate C2 systems). Utilizing an 
inductive analytical methodology, the participants were able explore specific activities and 
environments in which future C2 systems would be required to perform. 
Armed with this information, participants developed several candidate C2 systems, which were 
then narrowed down by the game design team to three options. A common set of criteria guided 
the development and refinement of these structures throughout the project and served as the basis 
for evaluation during the capstone event. The final three candidate C2 systems examined during 
the Capstone Event consisted of a traditional model using functional component commanders, 
and two novel approaches developed during the C2 Options Workshop: one based on a “Domain 
Commander” and another based on a “Cross-Domain Commander.” 
PROBLEM STATEMENT  
The findings from the Global 2012 Project suggest that current service or component-centric 
command and control structures at the operational level of war may be inadequate for effectively 
executing cross-domain operations as envisioned by the Air Sea Battle (ASB) Concept. While 
this concept outlines the need to command and control ‘cross-domain operations’ which are 
joint, networked and integrated, no organizational structure is proposed, only the requirement 
that any suitable structure must be capable of tight, real-time coordination. 
PURPOSE 
This project will inform the development and refinement of a Joint XDO C2 CONOPS that 
describes how to command joint forces while executing cross-domain operations in future high 
intensity A2/AD environments.  
OBJECTIVES  
Calendar Year 2013: Possible C2 Structures are identified, analyzed, selected to support 
development of a Joint XDO C2 CONOPS 
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Calendar Year 2014: A draft CONOPS describing the selected C2 structure has been developed 
by the ASB C2 Working Group, examined in a NWC-run analytical event, and revised by the 
Working Group to support future tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) development. 
CONSTRAINTS:  
? Based on guidance from the ASB Office, the candidate C2 structure and processes 
should be capable of performing cross-domain operations in future high-intensity 
A2/AD environments. 
? Based on guidance from the ASB Office, the candidate C2 structure and processes must 
account for coalition integration. 
? Development and examination of the candidate C2 structure should adhere to governing 
joint doctrine wherever possible, such as the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations 
(CCJO), Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC), and other Joint Operational 
Concepts (JOCs) as appropriate. 
OVERARCHING RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Based upon CNO’s area of interest, subsequent literature review by the Naval War College 
WGD faculty, and the two primary objectives for the project, the following research questions 
guided the design and development of the project:  
? Which of the three candidate C2 systems is best suited to command and control 
combined forces engaged in cross-domain operations in a high-intensity A2/AD 
environment, and why? 
DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS 
While definitions are usually provided at the end of a document, the importance of the following 
terms to the Global ’13 project, along with their potential unfamiliarity, warrants their inclusion 
at this stage of the report: 
Anti-Access (A2): Those actions and capabilities, usually long-range, designed to 
prevent an opposing force from entering an operational area. 
Area-Denial (AD): Those actions and capabilities, usually shorter-range, designed to 
keep an opposing force out, but to limit its freedom of action within the operational area. 
Cross-Domain Operations (XDO): The use of capabilities in one or multiple domains to 
reduce risk and gain or maintain access in another domain. 
Command and Control (C2): The exercise of authority and direction by a properly 
designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the 
mission. 
Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Concept: A Department of Defense document that reflects new 
and creative ways of integrating the Services in order to reduce risk, maintain U.S. 
freedom of action, and project power in the global commons during peacetime and crises.
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II. C2 Requirements Online Workshop 
The C2 Requirements Workshop was the first event in the Global ’13 Operational C2 Project. 
Conducted online via a web site designed and hosted by NWC, the purpose of the workshop was 
to better define the conditions, capabilities, criteria and challenges affecting future C2 structures 
intended to plan, direct, monitor and assess cross-domain operations at the operational level. 
After viewing briefs addressing the Air Sea Battle Concept, Domain Definitions, Cross-Domain 
Operations, and Command and Control (C2) in Cross-Domain Settings, participants responded to 
a questionnaire to solicit their input regarding time, space and force factors influencing XDO-C2, 
the internal functions of XDO-C2 organizations, the impact of coalition participation in XDO-
C2, and the relevant criteria necessary to evaluate XDO-C2 structures. Participants were also 
able to ask questions and exchange ideas via the web site’s discussion board. 
The criteria introduced at the C2 Requirements Workshop consisted of the following, based on 
organizational theory and joint operational warfare: 
Unity of Effort: The C2 construct ensures that all execution decisions and apportionment 
requests remain aligned with the operation's mission and commander's intent. The 
organizational structure fosters a sense of cohesion and unity of purpose throughout the 
planning/directing/monitoring/assessing process. 
Resiliency: The positive ability of the C2 system or a specific organization to adapt and 
overcome setbacks and fill important positions quickly and satisfactorily. This robustness 
is also a function of the number of command layers, degree of centralization vs. 
decentralization, and reliability of supporting C4ISR systems. 
Flexibility: The C2 construct is broadly adaptable to a wide range of regions and tasks. 
The organization can expand or contract with changing circumstances without serious 
loss of effectiveness. It is able to respond to changes in mission and resources. 
Information is acquired and passed quickly and reliably to help build the situational 
awareness of subordinate, superior and adjacent commands. It exercises decentralized 
execution, delegates specific defined functions, and rapidly deploys forces to meet 
specific situations. 
Simplicity: Chain of command is clear and straightforward. Responsibilities and 
authorities are clearly delineated with no overlap. Subordinate commands are responsible 
to no more than one superior at any given time. Processes and procedures are 
straightforward and foster clear direct communication. 
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Continuity: The command organization smoothly transitions across the range of military 
operations. Once established, organization should only undergo small changes in dealing 
with pre-hostility, combat, and post hostility operations. 
Span of Control: The area of activity or number of functions, people, or things for which 
an individual or organization is responsible. Span of control should not exceed the 
superior’s ability to effectively oversee and employ the subordinate unit. 
Stability: The stable organization is characterized by predictability and control. 
Structure, routine, policies, etc., have been established to remove uncertainty from the 
environment. Goals are clear and people understand who is responsible for what. 
During the online workshop, participants identified three additional criteria, defined as follows: 
Interoperability: The ability to interact with subordinate, adjacent, and higher 
organizations that have different missions and authorities. 
Span of Understanding: The ability to make timely and relevant decisions and complete 
key tasks as a result of a complete understanding of all organizations’ actions and 
capabilities that exist within the C2 system. 
Mission Accomplishment: The stable organization is characterized by predictability and 
control. Structure, routine, policies, etc., have been established to remove uncertainty from 
the environment. Goals are clear and people understand who is responsible for what. 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
C2 Criteria Assessment  
Survey questions 19–25 from the online workshop asked respondents to indicate the level of 
importance of seven possible criteria that could be used to assess the performance of joint cross-
domain C2 structures at the operational level of war. Response choices were based on a five-
point Likert-scale (most important, very important, important, somewhat important, and not 
important). Results suggest unity of effort to be the most important criteria, followed by 
resiliency, flexibility, simplicity, span of control, continuity, and stability. See Table 1 for a 
summary of participant responses. 
Time, Space, and Force Factors and Future A2/AD Environments  
Survey question 17 asked respondents to describe the interrelated time, space, and force factors 
that characterize future environments in which XDO C2 will be performed. Time will most 
likely be set by the opposing force—with little indications and warning—thereby requiring a 
swift response from forward deployed forces in the region. The tyranny of distance by which 
U.S. forces will close on an adversary presents myriad challenges to operating in an A2/AD 
environment. For example, forces transiting great distances should expect communications 
denied, degraded, or hostile environments targeted by advanced adversary cyber and space 
capabilities. In addition, defending logistics assets over long transits will impact resources that 
could otherwise be employed for immediate offensive response operations. 
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The rapid and persistent pace by which an adversary employs multiple capabilities to achieve 
effects in specific domains, its use of interior lines of communication, and the employment of 
significant quantities of diverse weapons systems will present unique challenges to forces 
striving to gain and maintain access and project power in multiple domains. Forces should also 
anticipate non-state actors with irregular and distributed leadership structures to complicate the 
actions and decision-making of combined forces. 
Participants also focused on the complexities associated with cross-domain operations. These 
discussions may be best characterized by the following participant response; “Forces can operate 
in one domain, deliver payloads through another domain (which can affect the success or 
outcome), that have an effect on a third domain, which can ultimately allow access for delivery 
of an effect in a fourth domain.” U.S. capabilities across domains will aggregate, reconfigure, 
and disaggregate more fluidly during campaigns, operations, missions and tasks. Forces will 
have to operate at varying operational tempos in different domains (for example forces moving 
faster in the air domain than in the subsurface). Distributed forces may not have a common 
operating picture in communication denied environments, while autonomous forces will likely 
operate alongside traditional forces in all domains, as well as in different domains and phases at 
the same time. 
Another key element of time is the speed by which information travels to decision makers. 
Higher headquarters awareness of the changing battle space and generation of new orders to 
subordinates coupled with the battle rhythm of operations centers and fires (both kinetic and non-
kinetic) processes are critical time elements for which future C2 systems must account. U.S. and 
allied forces must have an awareness of activities in all domains where they are operating, the 
advantages and disadvantages of operating in all domains, and the access requirements and 
capabilities that forces can offer to achieve effects in other domains. The different characteristics 







































































25 Resiliency (0) (2) (11) (27) (28) 4.19 
Table 1: Frequency Distribution and Mean Table for Survey Questions 19–25 
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important in synchronizing cross-domain effects. However, depending solely on technology to 
communicate in expected communications denied environments will increase the likelihood of 
mission failure. 
Political affirmation of military coalition participation is effected by myriad factors causing vast 
uncertainty for leveraging coalition capabilities. Political retraction of military coalition 
participation can occur without warning causing high risk to coalition operational capability, 
especially if the coalition is heavily manned by any given nationality. The decision process for a 
coalition to accept new missions may not match the speed of other more efficient organizations, 
especially due to political factors. Moreover, many nations only allow their forces to deploy to a 
coalition for a short period of time, causing a very high rate of turnover and loss of corporate 
knowledge and organizational proficiency in specific tasks and functions. 
Coalition AOR boundaries mat not align with Unified Command Plan (UCP) Areas of 
Responsibility (AOR), causing singular coalition operations to exist across multiple Combatant 
Commander’s (COCOMs) AORs. In addition, national caveats might preclude operations by 
certain coalition forces within specific Joint Operating Areas (JOAs). Future C2 systems 
comprised of coalition forces will have to account for relationships of other “friendly” forces and 
the ability to leverage each other's forces and resources without violating mandates, treaties, or 
the political will of a coalition partner. Within a coalition, the agreements and authorizations 
reached with a nation’s navy often do not imply that the agreement is valid with a nation’s coast 
guard, thereby negating the use of coast guard forces, which in some cases are more capable than 
their naval counterparts. Developing coalition partnerships may be more prominent when 
collective national interests are at stake in specific geographic areas, thereby causing the 
coalition AOR to be vastly smaller than the COCOM AOR; but still requiring full integration of 
operations across multiple domains. 
PDMA Activities and C2 Systems 
Survey question 18 asked participants to describe the internal actions or activities that XDO C2 
structures will have to perform. Responses were binned into four pre-determined categories: 
planning, directing, monitoring, and assessing. 
Planning Activities  
Command and control infrastructure and processes must be adapted to properly plan for cross-
domain operations. Future C2 systems must synchronize operational planning across combined, 
joint, and service component headquarters. Forces must be capable of planning both single and 
cross-domain operations, which will require the associated planning groups to possess adequate 
representation from all domains in order to maximize effectiveness and efficiency across the 
force. This integrated planning group should also include information dominance planners from 
across the services in order to quickly synchronize effects. Planners should identify the required 
capabilities and capacities of the forces to disrupt, destroy, and defeat adversary kill chains, as 
well as identify, plan, and acquire the logistics to sustain those forces. Forces should plan for 
operations in challenging communications environments and account for primary, backup, and 
tertiary communications pathways in their plans. Planning in conditions where communications 
are degraded or denied is problematic and should be practiced by service and joint headquarters. 
II. C2 Requirements Online Workshop 
7 
Planning should also include ways to counter degradation, denial, and data manipulation 
throughout all phases of the campaign. 
Coalitions often assume that forces will arrive with tactical proficiency, though a foundational 
level of operational training should be conducted to ensure awareness of and ability to conduct 
various contingency plans, and to ensure that forces and headquarters remain proficient. 
However, such training will be complicated by the fact that some nations are reluctant to exercise 
with other nations, even potentially with nations in the same coalition. These nations may 
exercise in parallel with coalition partners, but not directly with some partners. Coalitions are 
assembled by nations of the willing, and therefore the ability and authority of individual coalition 
forces to execute particular missions - whether offensive or defensive in nature - must be 
understood and respected when it comes to operational planning. Another area which must be 
addressed is the planning assumptions, which need to be agreed upon by the coalition as a whole 
to prevent potential confusion or dissention within the coalition. Planners must also appreciate 
that cultural differences will exist between coalition countries, which will require patience and 
understanding to overcome. Lastly, future C2 systems should strive to support requests for 
information via the cultural process of the nation making the request, and to provide the 
information via their process as well. 
Directing Activities  
XDO C2 structures must be able to transmit information quickly and securely, using 
interoperable (between services and nations) communication systems that are highly resistant to 
enemy attacks. These systems will “need to get the right information to the right person and unit 
in time to take action inside the enemy's OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act) loop for 
friendly mission accomplishment.” Additionally, in case of lost or degraded communications, a 
clear understanding of commander's guidance and intent, and authorities to act, will be required 
so that units can execute actions and advance the plan without depending on updates from the 
commander. 
The joint force will need to quickly combine capabilities with mission partners across domains, 
echelons, geographic boundaries and organizations. Emerging and full-spectrum capabilities, 
such as cyber, space, ISR, intelligence and special operations forces, need to be integrated with 
traditional domain capabilities (maritime, land, and air) and employed collectively to achieve 
access within and across domains. One participant noted, “depending on the units and number of 
units, be able to change or share units within a structure, as a single unit may be able to effect 
more than one domain or conduct tasks for two separate commanders depending on C2 
structure.” Picking the right asset for the task may require a change in mind set about how to 
accomplish objectives. Future C2 systems must rapidly deconflict fires and re-allocate forces 
outside the normal tasking process (ATO from air perspective) based on prioritized requirements 
of domain, cross-domain, or functional component commanders. 
Coalition doctrine must clearly articulate command relationships and authorities over assigned 
forces. Clear and unambiguous guidance will allow commanders to command and will alleviate 
confusion as time progresses and the original personalities that formed the coalition are no longer 
present. Additionally, as new members join the coalition, a clear mandate will be available to set 
expectations. Finally, if doctrine does not clearly communicate command relationships and 
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authorities, it will be exponentially more difficult (or impossible) to firmly coordinate across all 
nations as time progresses and political will changes. The coalition force generation process is a 
constant negotiation requiring continuous key leader engagement to maintain force flow. The 
coalition commander must not only balance the granted forces across priorities, but also 
continually plead the case for continued force flow to coalition nations. Coalition force 
apportionment and allocation must be balanced against other organizations performing similar or 
adjacent missions. This can be accomplished via a Joint Intelligence Board where joint priorities 
can be established and general agreements can be reached to balance the entire force to meet the 
mission(s). 
Monitoring Activities 
Situational awareness emerged as the primary theme related to monitoring activities. Responses 
were further distributed into three broad categories: information processing, information 
management, and information distribution. Future command structures and processes will have 
to retrieve, analyze, and disseminate information and intelligence to identify threats that impede 
forces from gaining and maintaining domain access. Service and joint operations centers will 
need to maintain timely situational awareness of all forces (Blue and Red) both in and out of 
theater. Information related to cross-domain capabilities, domain access requirements, 
vulnerabilities, levels of risk, and performance measures of both BLUE and RED forces must be 
acquired and disseminated to the entire force. Flexible and scalable communication systems, 
information exchange systems, and operating pictures common throughout the system will help 
gain and maintain requisite levels of situational awareness to support commanders. 
Future C2 system should account for new ways of organizing and managing information and 
knowledge related to cross-domain operations in order to better enable cross-domain 
headquarters “to focus on the right things at the right time with the right people.” While 
actionable intelligence is challenging to share in a timely manner between US national forces, it 
is even more challenging to share with many coalition forces, especially for offensive missions. 
Therefore, the intelligence disclosure process must be well-engineered to create the shortest 
possible disclosure process timetable, and missions must be assigned in alignment with the 
ability to share actionable intelligence. 
Assessment Activities 
Effects assessments are very difficult to generate and share in a coalition due to national 
interests, disclosure issues, and cultural face-saving boundaries. Commanders must be prepared 
to accept relatively shallow assessments and develop the capability to assess coalition-generated 
effects within and across domains. Cross-domain risk assessment and management provides 
planners with an important tool to understand levels of risk within and across domains, and 
corresponding levels of effort required to reduce risk. The system must evaluate readiness, 
logistics support, and relief of defensive forces to ensure they’re able to perform assigned 
missions across domains. It must also establish continuous risk barometer assessments and 
analysis of capacity across the domains, and assess the status and location of subordinate, 
adjacent, and higher echelon forces. 
Service and joint operations centers could consider creating a new “strategy cell” designed to 
conduct mission analysis and recommend utilization of service capabilities, evaluate single and 
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cross-domain risks, readiness, priorities and objectives. This cell would coordinate, synchronize, 
and cascade strategic information for current and future cross-domain planning cells. Several 
responsibilities identified include: evaluate commander tasks and guidance, external conditions 
(Time-Space-Force), whole of coalition capabilities-limitations-constraints-ROE-authorities, 
subordinate organization risks-capability-prioritization inputs, likely enemy actions/reactions, 
time horizon, perform earliest stages of OODA models, evaluate high-level campaign risks, 
integrate national strategic messaging capabilities-requirements, and provide strategic direction 
to next level XDO planning (resourcing) entities. Other assessment activities of this cell include: 
evaluate time-force operational risks, domain weapon system 
capabilities/roles/capacities/readiness/attrition, and incorporate other component commander risk 
assessments and recommended priorities. 
Coalition Integration Challenges 
Participants identified the following primary C2 challenges associated with conducting cross-
domain operations with allies and partners in future high-intensity A2/AD environments: 
classification restrictions and information sharing; language and culture barriers; policy 
restrictions and execution authorities; doctrinal gaps and overlaps; lack of knowledge or 
misunderstanding of U.S. and allied objectives, risks, capabilities, authorities, organizational 
processes, and command relationships; and interoperability among people, platforms, and 
systems. 
U.S. and international allies and partners must develop persistent bilateral and multilateral 
cooperative engagement activities-in the areas of education, training, and exercises- to develop 
short-term and long-term collaborative solutions to address these challenges. Military leaders at 
all levels-from flag and general officers to tactical unit commanders- must develop and maintain 
trust and confidence, through persistent engagement, to evolve into a combined force capable of 
addressing any threat or contingency. Participants identified the need to leveraging regional 
mechanisms to enhance multilateral military cooperation in these areas and working towards 
expanding current bilateral arrangements into multilateral arrangements. 
DOTMLPF Challenges and Joint XDO C2 
The DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and 
Facilities) construct was used as a lens for participants to examine the myriad implementation 
challenges associated with conducting joint cross-domain operations in future A2/AD 
environments. Leadership, authorities, and command relationships emerged as the top three 
challenges identified by workshop participants. Personnel, facility, and policy challenges 
identified were limited and discussed within the other categories. While this effort was not a 
major focus of the workshop or project, the following insights may have applicability to the joint 
force and warrant further investigation. 
Doctrine 
The fundamental principles that guide the employment of joint forces attempting to gain 
operational access in high intensity A2/AD environments are limited. Current joint doctrine—
ranging from concepts to tactics, techniques, and procedures—does not address the command 
and control of forces conducting cross-domain operations in these environments. For changes in 
doctrine to occur, the joint force must understand and fundamentally alter the way it thinks and 
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approaches warfare. Specifically, leveraging capabilities in different domains to enhance the 
strengths or reduce the vulnerabilities in others is an emerging concept difficult to grasp within 
and between services. However, through the employment of educational briefings and virtual 
forums, participants developed a deeper understanding towards identifying problems and 
potential solutions. Increased interaction between services and nations through similar forums 
would enable military leaders to continue advancing the state of thinking, development, and 
implementation of directing and controlling forces within and between domains. Participants 
noted that services tend to be more reliant on their own doctrine than joint doctrine. Therefore, to 
develop an effective joint XDO C2 process, new approaches to developing and implementing 
joint doctrine for the 21st century warfighting commander may be required. 
Organization 
The ways in which the joint force is organized to fight future conflicts may not be optimized. 
The service and functional constructs of today may require new and innovative ways of 
organizing to effectively conduct cross-domain operations. Depending on the approach taken, 
this could be a complete overhaul of existing structures and processes or simply a slight 
modification. In an effort to gain a competitive advantage over the adversary and win future 
conflicts, today’s leaders should be open to change. Whether making an extensive or moderate 
change, leaders must first define the mission, roles, relationships, processes, and authorities of 
their organization. Accordingly, future organizations must work closely with sister services and 
have the structure to allow for cross representation of personnel based on capabilities and desired 
effects (e.g., kinetic and non-kinetic). Future structures will also have to overcome classification 
barriers to allow seamless sharing of information and capabilities. While a single organization 
would be ideal from a unity of command perspective, span of control challenges may require the 
force to sub-organize by geographic area, function, or mission, depending on the adversary and 
region. Future changes to organizations will require a renewed focus on joint training and 
education. 
Training 
Executing cross-domain operations in future A2/AD environments require joint forces to develop 
and maintain specific skills, knowledge, and proficiencies that do not exist today. As one 
participant noted, deficiency in this area stems from “the customer not fully understanding the 
product and the producer does not fully understanding the customer.” To effectively perform 
cross-domain operations in a future conflict, U.S. forces must train and practice on a recurring 
basis in denied and degraded communications environments. As one participant noted, “not 
practicing any task routinely is a reliable indicator that we will not be able to execute proficiently 
when needed.” The familiarity with organizational relationships, processes, and authorities 
between organizations that training provides also enhances unity of effort and cross-domain 
synergy. 
Materiel 
Cross-domain interoperability in a future command and control system is not a formal definition 
in current doctrine. This emerging concept refers to the interchangeability of platforms, systems, 
people, and technical support infrastructure between domains. The overall objective is to replace 
one or more of these components without reducing the ability of forces to gain or maintain 
access in multiple domains. The joint force does not acquire and develop new platforms or 
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systems with this aim in mind. Accordingly, the type of materiel available to the joint force to 
effectively perform cross-domain operations may be insufficient. One participant indicated, 
“Information transparency and systems interoperability will be required all the way from the 
sensor data level up to operational planning.” The joint force must strive to develop and program 
with the ultimate goal of “allowing units from different services to talk directly to each other.” 
Breaking down service barriers and working towards this goal will require strategic patience, 
persistence, and a common approach developed and implemented through the Department of 
Defense’s Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). However, as one 
player noted, JCIDS does not define acquisition requirements and evaluation criteria for future 
defense programs within the context of cross-domain operations. Closing the material gap will be 
a long-term endeavor that must be supported by current and future leaders. 
Leadership 
The way we lead joint forces today was viewed as a key challenge to conducting effective cross-
domain operations in future A2/AD environments. The use of mission command type orders and 
decentralized planning and execution at the lowest levels across the force will require leaders to 
engage in new forms of education and training. From tactical unit commanders through Flag and 
General Officers, leaders must embrace and practice this style of command early and often. 
Leadership education should highlight how the pace of an A2/AD fight does not allow for the 
traditional, deliberative C2 processes that we have become accustomed to. In addition, leadership 
within each service should consider changes in the way it views career progression. Current 
service and community pipelines select leaders mainly on performance within a particular 
community or service, while viewing career progression based on performance and contributions 
both within and across domains may enhance joint, cross-domain synergy. 
Today’s leaders make decisions in relatively low-risk environments where information, 
intelligence, and communications are reliable and timely. In future warfighting environments 
where these necessities may become limited or absent, operational and strategic leaders must 
communicate clear guidance, priorities and authorities to their subordinate commanders early in 
the conflict, before communications become degraded and denied. This will enable subordinate 
commanders to ensure that their execution decisions and apportionment requests remain aligned 
with the intent and risk tolerance of their commander. 
Command Relationships 
New command relationships between organizations and services may need to exist in order to 
foster the creativity and coordination required to overcome communication challenges between 
domain commanders. Current command and control structures and processes enable leaders to 
retain control of forces in a particular domain, instead of employing forces in different domains 
to enhance domain strengths and reduce vulnerabilities in others. Consequently, competing 
priorities and battle space coordination and deconfliction must be at the forefront of examining 
future command relationships. Command relationships and authorities will also be essential to 
ensure that forces are employed effectively from long distances. There must be clear delineation 
of authorities and transfer of authorities and relationships as the operation moves forward in time 
and proximity to the fight. If this is not accomplished, key components of the system will fail 
and cause increased risks to the system. 
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Friction and misunderstanding between services and command organizations will cause 
problems and delays in execution when limited time is available to resolve issues or differences. 
A few seconds could mean the difference between mission accomplishment and failure. Support 
relationships appeared to emerge as the “most poorly defined of the four command 
relationships…but we rely upon it more for ego-based reasons than because it makes the most 
sense.” Clear and simple command relationships built on unity of command will enable leaders 
to achieve maximum potential from their people and capabilities. Changes to existing command 
relationships need to be reflected in joint and service doctrine, and practiced among joint forces. 
Authorities  
The rapidly changing and complex A2/AD environment requires commanders to act quickly and 
decisively. Pushing authorities down to the lowest possible level in the early stages of a conflict 
is fundamental to succeeding in this environment. By giving subordinate commanders the “what” 
to do vice the “how,” it will enable the joint force to play to both its operational strengths and 
adversarial weaknesses. Providing operational and tactical commanders with the proper authority 
to act will reduce dependency on hierarchical and rigid C2 processes that increasingly elevate 
operational authority to the National Command Authority. Working jointly, to determine which 
forces can control which capabilities, needs to be well thought-out and exercised during phase 
zero of a campaign.
 13 
III. C2 Options Workshop 
WORKSHOP OVERVIEW 
The three-day C2 Options Workshop was conducted 25–27 June, 2013 at the U.S. Naval War 
College (NWC) in Newport, RI. Two independent teams, Team A and Team B, notionally 
represented a Joint Planning Group (JPG) with coalition representation. Teams were led by 
representatives from the Air Sea Battle Office, assisted by War Gaming Department facilitators. 
There was no routine interaction between the teams over the course of the workshop. JPGs were 
tasked with developing recommendations for possible C2 arrangements to support future 
operations within a fictitious operating environment. The fictional environment included 
adversarial and allied partners, kinetic and non-kinetic threats, forward operating bases, etc. The 
participants were also given Commander’s Intent and Guidance which outlined the assumptions, 
limitations and governing factors to be used in developing their C2 options. Each team received 
slightly different guidance in order to develop different C2 options for examination in the 
September Capstone Event. 
Each team was further divided into three cross-functional “pods.” Each of the pods had a slight 
bias towards two of the six functions, with an Intel/Fires Pod, Maneuver/Force Protection Pod, 
and a C2/Sustainment Pod. 
The first day of the workshop was focused on building a common understanding of the 
implications of cross-domain operations on the six operational functions: C2, intelligence, fires, 
maneuver, sustainment and operational protection. Via a facilitated discussion, participants 
identified the main inputs, activities and outputs associated with planning, directing, monitoring 
and assessing each function at the joint/coalition operational level and entered this data into the 
game tool. 
Associated XDO problems were then identified, discussed, and sorted. An XDO problem 
essentially answered the question, “What deficiencies are there in the way we either plan, direct, 
monitor or assess a particular operational function which have a negative effect on being able to 
direct and coordinate cross-domain ops?” For example, “What deficiencies are there in the way we 
plan fires which have a negative effect on being able to direct and coordinate cross-domain ops?” 
On the second day, each pod built a C2 structure designed to mitigate the previously identified 
XDO problems, resulting in three structures per team (A1, A2, A3 for Team A and B1, B2 and 
B3 for Team B). Along with the XDO problems, pods checked the C2 structures for functionality 
by considering the answers to a series of questions addressing operational functions. Questions 
addressed issues such as intelligence collection and dissemination, dynamic targeting, 
cyberspace integration, and logistic coordination. The “C2 trade space” was between the 
combatant commander and the task group. As an operational concept, ASB and XDO exert less 
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and less influence over C2 arrangements at increasingly strategic levels of decision making. 
Likewise, at levels increasingly below the task group, tactics and weapon system capabilities 
dominate, as platforms are fundamentally employed in single domains. 
The C2 structures consisted of command organizations (nodes)—groups to whom some form of 
command authority has been delegated, and exercise direction over subordinate commands and 
coordination with superior, adjacent, and subordinate commands—and two types of relationships 
(links): command relationships with legal authorities, and functional relationships that described 
the nature of the interaction between two nodes. 
Pods also considered the degree to which their structure exhibited the following C2 attributes 
developed during the C2 Requirements Workshop: 





? Span of Control 
? Stability 
? Interoperability 
? Span of Understanding 
? Mission Accomplishment 
On the third day pods presented their C2 structures in plenary. Following the final C2 structures 
out-brief, the pods used a multi-criteria decision aid, Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), to 
independently pair-wise compare the C2 attributes as criteria in order to weight them. The 
participants then used these criteria to pair-wise compare their team’s three C2 structures in order 
to inform the team’s C2 structure recommendation. 
PDMA PROBLEMS AND OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS  
This section summarizes the primary C2 problems identified across all six candidate structures 
related to planning, directing, monitoring, and assessing cross-domain operations. The nine 
major problems identified across all areas consist of the following:  
1. Effects of Communications Denied Environments: Red will work to create a 
communications-denied environment for Blue, significantly degrading Blue 
commander's ability to direct forces and reach back to remote information resources. 
2. Authorities: Retention of C2 authorities at higher levels of command may hamper 
the speed of speed of command in XDO operations. 
3. Coalition Operations: C2 difficulties caused by a lack of common equipment and 
processes with coalition partners will be magnified in a communications-denied 
environment. 
4. Situational Awareness (SA): SA requirements increase when operating in an A2/AD 
environment, due in part to the operational requirement to employ cross-domain 
solutions to achieve success. To effectively conduct XDO also requires a greater 
awareness of the status of friendly forces, since these forces may be initially 
assigned—and then reassigned—under the OPCON or TACON of various 
commanders, based on how the campaign is progressing. 
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5. C2 Systems/Hardware: Current C2 systems are not optimized to provide the 
consolidated, domain-based awareness of Red and Blue forces required to effectively 
PDMA cross-domain operations. (Related to SA) 
6. Service Parochialism/Bias: Institutional bias and resistance to change creates 
hurdles to unity of effort across C2 functions. 
7. Poor Understanding of the use of Capabilities across Domains: Due to functional 
area and service stovepipes, as well as classifications impediments, warfighters may 
be unaware of non-traditional capabilities that could be used to shape a domain and 
solve access problems. 
8. Prioritization of Assets across Lower Operational and Tactical Commanders: XDO 
may require the timely transition of capabilities among commanders. In a dynamic, 
communications-denied environment, this prioritization of assets and missions will have 
to be accomplished through collaboration between lower-level commanders. 
9. Risk Management: Commanders will be forced to make choices between force 
protection and operational employment considerations. 
Table 2 summarizes the primary C2 problems, organized by the following operational functions: 
command and control, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and operational protection.  
Command and Control 
Planning Highly centralized approval authorities; denied and degraded environments; limited 
interoperability with coalition partners; lack of environmental awareness; duplicative systems; 
functional component parochialism in specific domains, along with institutional bias and 
resistance. 
Directing Lack of secure and reliable communications; hierarchical logistics structures and apportionment 
processes; no single common operating picture; over-classification of information; lack of XDO C2 
training; rapidly changing role of the Commanders; lack of geographic proximity between 
commanders. 
Monitoring Lack of understanding regarding operational effects; over-manned organizations; over-reliance on 
technology; internally focused monitoring; unclear and unfocused commander’s intent and 
guidance. 
Assessing Post-strike modifications; common awareness of XDO requirements; consistent assessment practices. 
Intelligence 
Planning Disjointed Collection Management…different collection platforms, TTPs, and products from 
various services and nations; greater Intel requirements than assets available; unorganized and 
ill-defined cross-domain processes for intelligence tasking; different doctrinal definitions among 
coalition partners; lack an effective joint intelligence preparation of the environment (JIPOE) for 
cross-domain operations; competing COCOM requirements. 
Directing Lack of understanding of adversarial intentions, capabilities, and employment of forces; 
overreliance on full-motion video; shortened intelligence-operations cycle; no common operations-
intelligence picture; limited broadcast of intelligence updates to entire C2 system; TTPs and ISR 
CONOPS require refinement; operations-intelligence coordination is insufficient; over-reliance on 
communications for reach back. 
Monitoring Lack of evolved situational awareness regarding strategic intelligence; insufficient speed of 
analysis, limited situational awareness and ability to analyze domain access requirements, 
capabilities, and operational effects; multiple COPs; lack effective prioritization of low density, 
high-demand assets. 
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Assessing Lack of common data storage, knowledge management practices, and decision aids; lack timely 
intelligence assessments; lack the capability to self-assess the effectiveness of the intelligence 
process; need to reassess balance between subjective and objective analysis techniques and 
results; lack new JIPOE baseline for XDO; classification barriers stymie intelligence sharing. 
Fires 
Planning None identified.  
Directing None identified.  
Monitoring None identified.  
Assessing Risk-averse decision-making. 
Sustainment 
Planning Dispersing forces among several locations requires placing required infrastructure support at all 
potential bases; difficulty in sustaining seabasing operations; locations of high-tech weapons 
reload facilities within adversary weapon ranges. 
Directing None identified. 
Monitoring Requirement for awareness of all forces operating in all domains to support dispersed resupply 
operations. 
Assessing The lack of more secure and redundant logistics communications systems enables adversaries to 
inject corrupt data into our supply network, degrading our ability to accurately assess the 
effectiveness of our sustainment actions. 
Operational Protection 
Planning The difficulty in concealing forces which have been dispersed for extended periods of time; the 
inability to accept and distribute risk to mission and effectively allocate forces across domains, to 
include the allocation of force protection assets at the expense of another mission of task; the 
inability to distinguish operations that harden and defend assets; the difficulty in developing plans 
to deal with focused enemy attacks when possessing limited “defeat” resources. 
Directing Inability to distinguish force protection operations between units; changing nature of force 
protection and associated decision-making requirements; transport layer vulnerabilities; difficulty 
in directing forces that must remain covert or undetected to prevent being targeted. 
Monitoring None identified.  
Assessing Lack of information/intelligence sharing with force protection units. 
Table 2: Participant-identified C2 Problems 
OVERVIEW OF C2 OPTIONS  
Pod A1 
A1 was tasked with developing a domain-based approach that was flexible, simple, and 
improved operational integration at lower echelons. This system was led by a standing Air-Sea 
Battle Commander (ASB CDR) and a supporting cross-domain staff responsible for planning, 
directing, monitoring and assessing A2/AD and power projection efforts in the JOA. The ASB 
CDR had operational control of multiple Cross-Domain Operations Mission Commanders (XDO 
Mission CDRs), who in turn had tactical control of joint and coalition forces, based on the 
mission assigned by the ASB CDR. On-station forces were initially assigned to particular XDO 
Mission CDRs based on the standing OPLAN, as modified by ASB CDR Guidance, with follow-
on forces assigned by the ASB CDR to XDO Mission CDRs as required. The cross-domain staffs 
supporting each XDO Mission CDR maintained the ability to coordinate and integrate personnel 
and forces to execute XDO missions designed to disrupt, destroy or defeat enemy forces. 
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Pushing the XDO capability to the XDO Mission Commander level would enable decentralized 
planning and execution. 
Pod A2 
A2 was tasked with developing a domain-based C2 structure. This C2 structure was centered on 
a JTF Commander with subordinate Domain Commanders (DCs) tasked with gaining access and 
operating within a specific domain. Each DC would have OPCON of assigned forces and 
TACON of forces or capabilities supplied temporarily by other DCs to accomplish specific 
missions. When utilizing forces or capabilities supplied by other DCs in concert with his/her own 
forces, the DC would establish a cross-domain task group (XDO TG). Control measures and 
PDMA would be done by an XDO coordinator at the JTF level working with XDO cells in each 
DC staff. This C2 system addresses the challenges associated with a communications degraded 
environment by pushing XDO functions down to the DC. 
Pod A3 
A3 was tasked with developing a domain-based C2 system that fosters decentralized 
execution. This C2 system used a combined joint task force (CJTF) subordinate to the 
geographic combatant commander (GCC) to oversee and lead operations in the JOA. The 
CJTF Commander (CJTF CDR) has the authority to establish multiple mission-focused 
subordinate combined joint task groups (CJTGs), combined joint task units (CJTUs), and 
combined joint task elements (CJTEs) as necessary to accomplish its assigned mission and 
tasks. The CJTF CDR will select the most appropriate domain commander (e.g., maritime, 
land, cyber, etc.) to lead these subordinate commands. For example, the CJTF maritime 
domain commander might have a few subordinate CTGs. Cross-domain synergy is 
accomplished in this C2 structure at the GCC, CJTF CDR, and each of the subordinate 
combined and joint headquarters units. 
Each Commander’s principle mission is to combine effects to create asymmetric dilemmas for 
the enemy. There is no one central XDO coordination center. Clearly, comprehensive 
integration at all levels and the adoption and embracement of dynamic and flexible support 
relationships will be necessary for this C2 structure to be effective. These paradigm shifts will 
require training, education and in some cases a cultural shift. This C2 structure relies on 
centralized planning and decentralized execution which is not to say that planning only occurs 
at the highest echelons. In fact, planning occurs at every echelon but is informed and guided by 
an overall centralized plan consisting of clearly stated mission oriented commanders guidance, 
intent, and an overall desired end state. In this manner, unity of command and unity of effort 
are maintained while affording the highest degree of flexibility and adaptability. Reliance on 
informed initiative and trust of subordinates is just as important as simplicity and flexibility in 
this C2 arrangement. 
Pod B1 
B1 is characterized by a Joint Force Commander (JFC) who also serves as the 
Fires/Maneuver/Movement Commander (F/M/M CDR) and is responsible for initially executing 
all missions to gain and maintain access in accordance with ASB precepts. As access allows 
across the various domains, this commander will execute missions to achieve broader military 
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end states by projecting power. The Protection Commander, who is subordinate to the JFC, as 
well as the F/M/M CDR, executes Operational Protection missions for all forces and places 
assigned by the F/M/M CDR. The Protection Commander has four primary subordinate mission 
Task Group commanders, who are responsible for planning and executing missions in the areas 
of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), Space, Cyber, and Sustainment. 
Pod B2 
B2 emphasized Mission Command and attempted to maximize the ability to operate in a 
communications challenged environment through the use of a Cross-Domain Operations 
(XDO) Board at the Combined Joint Task Force Commander (CJTF CDR) level and the 
employment of multiple Cross-Domain Commands (XDCs) as the mission dictates. Because 
of the emphasis on mission command and commander’s guidance and intent, the XDC 
Commanders have authority and responsibility for assigned forces and are the point of 
integration for cross-domain effects for the mission. An XDC would be scalable and tailored 
to the mission, as determined by the CJTF CDR. 
Pod B3 
This C2 system used a sub-unified combined task force (CTF) subordinate to the geographic 
combatant commander to run operations in the JOA. With the U.S. as lead nation among the 
coalition, the CTF commander utilizes three functional subordinate commanders to manage 
forces and operations. The Fires, Movement, and Maneuver Commander would conduct 
offensive attack, offensive cyber operations, offensive space operations, and maneuver 
focused on the Disrupt and Destroy lines of ASB. A Protection Commander would be 
responsible for defending forces flowing into theater, focused on the disrupt and defeat lines 
of ASB, while a Sustainment Commander would provide control, prioritization, and direction 
for logistics functions supporting operations in the JOA. This structure is intended to 
enhance cross-domain synergy by breaking down the domain-centric control of force 
application by operationalizing a matrix-based organizational model where forces are 
primarily OPCON to the three functional commanders and provided to lower-echelon 
commanders via short-term TACON relationships. 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Participants from Team A and B selected mission accomplishment and unity of effort as the most 
important criteria for assessing the performance of future XDO C2 systems. Based on the criteria 
weighting and the subsequent comparisons of the various C2 systems, the workshop results 
indicated a clear preference for option A1 among the three Team A options, with A1 being the 
preferred choice across all 10 general criteria and 6 JOAC criteria. In team B, option B2 scored 
marginally better than options B1 and B3 from a total score perspective, and was the preferred 
choice for only 4 of the 10 general criteria and 4 of the 6 JOAC criteria. A summary of responses 
for both sets of criteria are provided in figures 4 and 5. 
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Figure 4: Player Weighting and Evaluation of General C2 Criteria 
 
Figure 5: Player Weighting and Evaluation of JOAC C2 Criteria 
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Overview of C2 Options  
The goal of the workshop was to develop two different C2 options that could be examined - 
along with the current functional component model—in the Global 2013 Capstone event. Since 
the resulting characteristics of options A1 and B2 were quite similar, options A2 and B2 were 
selected—based on both their suitability and distinguishability—as the two workshop C2 models 
for follow-on examination. 
Option A2: Domain-Based Commander Model 
This structure was organized by domain commanders (DCs). DCs were responsible for gaining 
and maintaining access in their respective domains, while preventing the adversary from doing 
the same. Each domain commander would have OPCON of assigned forces and TACON of 
forces or capabilities supplied by other DCs for specific missions. When utilizing forces or 
capabilities supplied by other DCs in concert with his or her own forces, the DC would establish 
a cross-domain task group (XDO TG). Control measures and PDMA would be done by an XDO 
coordinator at the CJTF level working with XDO cells in each DC staff. This C2 system 
addresses a communications degraded environment by pushing XDO functions down to domain 
commanders. This system also relies on significant and persistent training during peacetime to 
ensure seamless coordination and integration during a conflict. 
The XDO Board consists of the Deputy CJTF and the respective J-Code deputies, augmented by 
functional LNOs and senior coalition representatives. The board is responsible for defining and 
evaluating missions, recommending apportionment of allocated and assigned forces among DCs, 
managing Title 10 and Title 50 capabilities integration, and coordinating with the CJTF staff to 
link to national and service force providers for sustainment and information. Information is fused 
at the XDC level. Based on the recommendation of the XDO Board, organic ISR assets are 
apportioned from CJTF to DC Commanders, and can be re-apportioned to other DCs based on 
evolving mission requirements and priorities. The DC Commanders control collection 
requirements. The XDO Board assesses mission essential sustainment requirements and 
recommends allocation and prioritization to DCs. This assessment is based on direct inputs from 
DC staffs which are then coordinated, integrated, and prioritized based on CJTF guidance. The 
Deputy CJTF directs allocation of sustainment to each DC in facilitate mission accomplishment. 
Each DC maintains a combined XDO coordination element comprised of Navy, Army, Marine, 
and Air Force personnel, as well as coalition partners. While prioritization of missions and 
capabilities normally occur at the XDO Board, when communications between the XDO Board 
and the DCs are lost, these XDO coordination elements coordinate requirements, capabilities and 
effects across domains. Once XDO Task Groups are formed, local tactical control is delegated to 
assure continuity of operations. Figure 6 is a graphical depiction of the domain-based 
commander model, C2 Option A2.  
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Figure 6: Domain-Based Commander Model 
Option B2: Cross-Domain Commander Model 
This system emphasized Mission Command and the ability to operate in a communications- 
degraded environment. This system was organized by Cross-Domain Commanders (XDCs). 
XDCs are mission based and can be scalable and tailorable to the conflict or region. Keeping the 
number of XDCs to no greater than five or six will help mitigate potential span of control 
problems. Each XDC has the authority and responsibility for the forces—as assigned by the 
CJTF CDR—to complete a specific mission or line of effort. XDCs have OPCON of all assigned 
forces and can delegate TACON as appropriate. Depending on the mission, XDCs may be in a 
supporting or supported relationships with other XDCs by order of the CJTF CDR. This model 
depends greatly on the CJTF CDR’s intent & mission orders having sufficient clarity to enable 
subordinate commanders to operate without additional guidance. Most effects generated in this 
system are integrated at the XDC level, but can be delegated to appropriate subordinate levels 
when communications are denied or degraded. The creation and execution of XDCs should be 
exercised freely as new missions or lines of effort dictate. 
Similar to option A2 described previously, this model accounts for an XDO Board at the CJTF 
level which is responsible for defining and evaluating missions, and apportionment of allocated 
and assigned forces and assets to XDCs within the JTF as appropriate for assigned missions. 
Similarly, the XDO Board coordinates XDC staffs to link to national and service force providers 
for sustainment and information requirements and capabilities. Other similarities to option A2 
include intelligence fusion and coordination with national intelligence capabilities conducted by 
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a dedicated cell located on the CJTF staff. Similarly, coalition forces would also integrate into 
subcommands or joint task groups based on tailored mission. Accordingly, forces were primarily 
organized under separate joint integrated task groups by mission or warfare area (e.g., USW, 
SOF, SUW, Air, etc.). As previously noted, these forces could be delegated TACON to other 
XDCs as conflict evolves and the prioritization of these missions change. Figure 7 is graphical 
depiction of the cross-domain commander model, C2 Option B2. 
 
Figure 7: Cross-Domain Commander Model
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IV. C2 Criteria Refinement 
In addition to the 10 general C2 criteria which were a result of the C2 Requirements Online 
Workshop, the following 6 additional criteria were derived from the Joint Operational Access 
Concept and were used to evaluate the options developed in the C2 Options Workshop: 
Cross-Boundary Operations: The C2 structure is capable of supporting combat 
operations which commence immediately upon deployment and span multiple areas of 
responsibilities en route to the operational area; supports the integration of capabilities of 
geographical and functional combatant commanders with overlapping responsibilities. 
Global Distances: The C2 structure is capable of directing and coordinating forces 
originating well outside the theater of operations which deploy and maneuver 
independently on multiple lines of operation from multiple points of origin, and 
concentrate fluidly as required. 
Communications Challenged: A C2 environment characterized by degraded, denied, or 
hostile (use of EM spectrum increases risk of attack) communication networks. 
Operational Integration: High tempo, synchronized operations characterized by the use 
of mission command-type orders, and decentralized planning and execution at the lowest 
possible levels. 
Space and Cyber Incorporation: A C2 structure which fully includes space and 
cyberspace operations, enabling forces to exploit fleeting local opportunities for 
disrupting enemy systems. 
Cross-Domain Synergy: A C2 structure capable of leveraging capabilities in different 
domains such that each enhances and compensates for the vulnerabilities of the others in 
order to establish superiority in some combination of domains that will provide the 
freedom of action required by the mission. 
Following the C2 Options Workshop, the combined list of 16 criteria was reduced to the 
following 8, as these criteria were the ones—based on the participant’s AHP results—that were 
statistically most significant in differentiating between the various options: 




? Communications Challenged 
? Operational Integration 
? Cross-Domain Synergy 
? Global Distances 
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FLAG OFFICER AND GENERAL OFFICER ELECTRONIC QUESTIONNAIRE 
These eight criteria were incorporated into a second questionnaire and were distributed to U.S 
Flag and General Officers (FOGOs) to get their perspective regarding which C2 criteria were 
most relevant from an XDO perspective. 
C2 Criteria Assessment 
Questions 1-8 of the Flag and General Officer electronic survey asked respondents to distribute 
100 total points across eight criteria based on their relative importance to evaluating the 
performance of joint XDO C2 structures. The sum of points from all 27 survey respondents 
generated the following criteria ranking: 1) unity of effort; 2) operational integration; 3) 
simplicity; 4) resiliency; 5) flexibility; 6) communications challenged; 7) cross-domain synergy; 
and 8) global distances. The below figure provides a summary of total points for each of the 
eight criteria. 
 
Figure 8: Summary of Points for Eight C2 Criteria 
Additional C2 Criteria 
In addition to the eight criteria assessed in figure 8, participants also responded to an open-ended 
question asking for any additional C2 criterion for evaluating the performance of joint XDO C2 
structures at the operational level of war. Participant responses focused on criteria that maximize 
information superiority and coalition and joint integration and interoperability. Information 
superiority was viewed as the understanding of a “C2 system(s) architecture, vulnerabilities, 
adversary capabilities, and adversary actions on or against the system(s) in real-time.” Situational 
awareness across the command and control system should also maintain the “ability to 
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understand the enemy's order of battle, guidance and intent across all domains and distribute 
information rapidly and assuredly across friendly forces in order to increase effectiveness of the 
joint force.” Achieving information superiority in an A2/AD environment “will enable defense 
of the system and the ability to counter the adversary to ensure system integrity and therefore 
viability.” It will also enhance the ability of commanders “to out think, plan, direct, and assesses 
the fight of his opponent.” 
Several FOGOs noted that future military operations in A2/AD environments “will be executed 
with some type of coalition support.” The seamless integration of coalition partners into a 
common command and control system becomes more vital when executing cross-domain 
operations in an A2/AD environment. This system would enable forces to leverage allied 
capabilities in one to domain to gain or maintain access in other domains. For this to occur, the 
system “must incorporate the expertise and authorities of partner nations in any operation.” It 
must also support the ability for nations to organize, train, and equip personnel to “fill the joint 
or coalition manning document in a timely manner and achieve the necessary joint staff 
coherence that the speed of the problem demands." Specific capabilities and enablers identified 
include: tactics techniques, and procedures; equipment and technology; foreign disclosure 
policy; LNO exchanges; and a common commitment of cooperation, coordination, and 
transparency to build and maintain trust during all phases of an operation. 
The efforts of the Global ’13 project strive to maximize the proficiencies of a single C2 system 
that integrates all capabilities from across the services. One participant noted, “While this may be 
extremely advantageous, the Services continue to develop independent solutions for controlling 
forces and resources.” A single solution will require interoperable systems that can share and 
process data real-time across service organizations and operations centers. The Joint Logistics 
Enterprise (JLEnt) was identified as “a great example of the way ahead.” 
Final C2 Criteria 
After reviewing the results of the FOGO questionnaire, the following 6 criteria were settled upon 
as those criteria that would be used during the Capstone event: 
1. Unity of Effort: The C2 construct ensures that all execution decisions and 
apportionment requests remain aligned with the operation's mission and commander's 
intent. The organizational structure fosters a sense of cohesion and unity of purpose 
from planning to directing to monitoring to assessing. 
2. Flexibility: The C2 construct is broadly adaptable to a wide range of regions and 
tasks. The organization can expand or contract with changing circumstances without 
serious loss of effectiveness. It is able to respond to changes in mission and resources. 
Information is acquired and passed quickly and reliably to help build the situational 
awareness of subordinate, superior and adjacent commands. It exercises decentralized 
execution, delegates specific defined functions, and rapidly deploys forces to meet 
specific situations. 
3. Simplicity: Chain of command is clear and straightforward. Responsibilities and 
authorities are clearly delineated with no overlap. Subordinate commands are 
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responsible to no more than one superior at any given time. Processes and procedures 
are straightforward and foster clear direct communication. 
4. Resiliency: The positive ability of the C2 system or a specific organization to adapt 
and overcome setbacks and fill important positions quickly and satisfactorily. This 
robustness is also a function of the number of command layers, degree of 
centralization vs. decentralization, and reliability of supporting C4ISR systems under 
degraded, denied or hostile communications environments. 
5. Operational Integration: A C2 system capable directing and coordinating high 
tempo, distributed, synchronized operations characterized by the use of mission 
command-type orders, and decentralized planning and execution at the lowest 
possible levels across the force, regardless of service, nationality or physical 
distances, concentrating their efforts seamlessly. 
6. Cross-Domain Synergy: A C2 system capable of leveraging capabilities in different 
domains such that each enhances the strengths and compensates for the vulnerabilities 
of the others in order to establish superiority in some combination of domains that 
will provide the freedom of action required by the mission. A high degree of 
situational awareness and battle-space sense-making is a necessary enabler.
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V. Global Capstone Event 
OVERVIEW 
The Global ’13 Capstone Event was conducted 23–27 September, 2013 at the U.S. Naval War 
College in Newport, RI. The participants were divided into three combined Operational Planning 
Teams (OPTs) which were notionally formed by the Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) 
of a fictional region. Consisting of a scenario where regional tensions were escalating between 
an antagonistic Red and their regional neighbors, the GCC directed that contingency planning be 
conducted which would focus on the refinement of possible C2 arrangements for a combined 
task force to deal with the situation. 
Each OPT was assigned one of three possible C2 structures: a functional component commander 
based model and two novel approaches developed during the Options Workshop, one based on a 
“Domain Commander” and another based on a “Cross-Domain Commander.” The six criteria (or 
governing factors) which were identified prior to the event were used to guide the development 
of each candidate C2 structure. 
In addition to identifying command relationships and authorities, each OPT determined how 
their respective C2 structure addressed four key processes of interest—deliberate and dynamic 
targeting, intelligence tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, analysis, production, 
dissemination and integration, integrated air and missile defense (IAMD), and sustainment. 
Four vignettes which incorporated Red courses of action and likely Blue Coalition actions were 
used to stress and potentially drive improvements to the candidate C2 structures. The vignettes 
posed “what if” type problems to facilitate the critical analysis of a given C2 structure. 
Once all the C2 structures were modified in response to the vignettes and subjected to a “Peer 
Review” by all three OPTs, the finalized C2 structures were presented to the GCC (in the form of 
a flag panel, composed of 17 FOGO participants) during a “Super Plenary” session which was 
attended by all participants. 
It is important to remember that the Capstone event was modeled on a planning activity to 
recommend C2 arrangements, and was not a course of action (COA) development or move-step 
gaming activity intended to “fight the fight” and defeat Red. The OPTs were planning for the C2 
of a possible future conflict against Red, not conducting the actual operation. 
PRE-VIGNETTE WORK 
An Operational Environment/Road to Crisis (OE/RTC) described the geography and the 
relationships among the nations within the fictional region, as well as the military capability of 
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the regional antagonist, Red. It introduced a sequence of events which served to escalate tension 
in the region and lead to hostilities. 
Participants were to assume that all Blue coalition governments would support full participation 
of their military forces in potential Blue coalition operations versus Red, and that coalition of 
countries (AUS, CAN, GBR, JPN and U.S.) would act in concert to deter Red, and should 
deterrence fail, defeat Red’s A2/AD capabilities and their ability to achieve their regional 
military objectives. Due to Blue’s anticipated heavy reliance on advanced communications 
systems, participants were also to assume that Red would attempt to degrade Blue’s use of the 
electromagnetic spectrum, to include disruption of space and cyber systems, targeting both 
fielded forces and headquarters’ C2 systems. 
Up to this point, there had been little information pertaining to the C2 structures as to HOW 
certain activities would be conducted. While previous workshops defined some of the roles and 
responsibilities associated with given command nodes, the level of detail and completeness was 
insufficient for continued analysis. The participants therefore first described how the following 
processes were conducted within their particular C2 structure, focusing on their command node 
roles and responsibilities: 
? Deliberate and Dynamic Targeting: Described how the C2 system identified, 
developed and prioritized (and re-prioritized) targets, to include deliberate and dynamic 
targets. How did the C2 system identify available forces (to include cyberspace, space 
and coalition forces) and assign (or re-assign) them to targets/missions?  
? Intelligence Process: Described the all-domain intelligence architecture organic to the 
C2 system which supported national and theater level ISR management, I&W, SA 
building, and targeting. 
? Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD): Described the C2 arrangements to 
defend against aircraft, cruise and ballistic missiles from a theater or JOA perspective. 
? Sustainment: Described the process by which logistic requirements (supply and 
maintenance) were identified and prioritized, limited logistic resources were allocated 
and directed, and effectiveness was assessed. 
Given the limited amount of time available for this part of the event, participants focused on 
identifying where in their C2 structure key decisions are made as part of a particular process. 
Requirements prioritization, resource allocation, direction and adjustment, and assessment 
decisions were therefore of the most interest. Interest in a given decision was further increased 
when aspects of urgency, uncertainty, interdependency and dynamic change were present. 
Once all sub-processes had been assigned, each process group briefed the cell lead and the team 
on the rationale for their sub-process assignments, and entered the data into the game tool.  
VIGNETTE-BASED WORK 
Vignettes were briefed via PowerPoint presentation. Vignette drivers came in two forms: the C2 
system evaluation criteria, as well as “exemplars” which asked the participants to trace out a 
particular process based on XDO-related problems. 
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Based on the cell’s current C2 system (structure plus processes), cells initially determined their 
system’s strengths and weaknesses (S/W) using the six C2 criteria. To generate the initial S/W, 
participants individually wrote down any criteria based S/Ws on Post-It Notes, which were then 
discussed, clustered, summarized and prioritized prior to being entered into the game tool. Based 
on the weaknesses identified above, and tackled in priority order, participants made changes to 
their C2 structure. 
After completing the desired changes per weaknesses, the facilitator posed a series of specific 
questions or “exemplars” using details from the current vignette. Exemplars were designed to 
provide specific “what if” situations to help “wring-out” the four key processes above, which in 
turn had been mapped to ten XDO problems associated with the six operational functions derived 
from the C2 Options Workshop. The exemplars were not all inclusive; rather they exemplified 
the type of problem a cross-domain C2 system should be able to address. In the interest of time, 
not all functions or processes were examined during every vignette. Rather, the exemplars were 
distributed across the four vignettes in order to limit the breadth—but increase the depth—of 
analysis during each vignette. Organized by operational functions, the following questions were 
used to focus the C2 system review:  
1. Command and Control: How does this C2 structure facilitate a high degree of 
integration and synchronization in planning and execution across multiple domains 
simultaneously (and at lower echelons) at an operating tempo the enemy cannot 
match? (Focus Area: XDO Synergy, Mission Command). 
2. Intelligence: How is information (to include that gathered through computer network 
exploitation) tasked, collected, processed, exploited, analyzed, produced, 
disseminated and integrated within this C2 structure to facilitate XDO (I&W, 
targeting, situational awareness, etc.)? (Focus Area: Sense-Making). 
3. Maneuver: How does this C2 structure support distributed forces operating at global 
distances, deploying and maneuvering independently on multiples lines of operations 
from multiple points of origin, and concentrating fluidly as required? (Focus Area: 
Distributed Forces Over Global Distances). 
4. Fires: How does this C2 structure provide for the rapid re-tasking of employed units 
in any domain (implies reaching across organizational, service and national C2 
divisions) to exploit transient, localized opportunities? Includes the reallocation of an 
asset between different chains of command (COC), and the retasking of assets, based 
on mission priority (Focus Area: Re-Allocation of Forces). 
a. How does this C2 structure provide for access to and the coordination or 
integration of offensive cyberspace capabilities in a joint access campaign? 
(Focus Area: Cyberspace Integration) 
b. How does this C2 structure provide for access to and the coordination or 
integration of space capabilities in a joint access campaign? (Focus Area: Space 
Integration) 
c. How does this C2 structure provide for the coordination or integration of coalition 
forces with varying degrees of participation? (Focus Area: Coalition Force 
Integration) 
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d. How does this C2 structure conduct deliberate and dynamic targeting at a pace 
commensurate with XDO? (Focus Area: Re-Prioritization of Targets). 
5. Operational Protection: How does this C2 structure facilitate the direction and 
coordination of force protection, to include integrated air and ballistic missile defense 
and computer network defense? 
6. Sustainment: How does this C2 structure provide the necessary visibility of force 
status to enable real-time C2 of sustainment forces in support of rapidly changing 
XDO? 
At the end of each vignette, each participant completed a Likert survey to assess the C2 system’s 
overall strength and weakness relative to the C2 criteria. The facilitator monitored the survey 
results, in particular looking for outliers or disparities in the results, which were then discussed 
with the group in order to help the participants continue to refine their ability to assess the 
effectiveness of a C2 system. 
POST-VIGNETTE WORK/PRE-PLENARY 
Once the vignette portion of the event was completed, each team prepared two products. One 
was a brief for the participating FOGOs which explained the philosophy behind the C2 option 
they were given to examine and how it evolved over the course of the work. The second product 
was a final plenary briefing consisting of their final C2 structural configuration, including all 
relationships and key processes; the predominant strengths and weaknesses of the resulting C2 
system in terms of the criteria; and any final thoughts or observations. As there had been no 
plenary or other “cross-talk” events earlier in the week, a “peer review” session was conducted 
with the members of the other OPTs one day prior to the final plenary session. During this 
session, cell leads presented their draft C2 system briefs for the purpose of receiving constructive 
criticism from the other teams. Participants from the opposite teams first entered criteria-based 
weaknesses into the game tool, and then were able to question and further discuss aspects of the 
particular C2 system. At the completion of all three C2 briefings, participants returned to their 
cells and determined which, if any, weaknesses they wished to address in their final plenary 
brief. During this update period, the cell leads briefed the participating FOGOs on their 
respective C2 options, which prepared the FOGOs to actively participate in the final plenary 
session the following day. 
FINAL PLENARY 
The final plenary was attended by all participants. Each team presented their final C2 system 
brief, followed by a short question & answer session intended to provide any required 
clarification or amplification. The intent of these activities was to provide the fullest description 
of each C2 system in a consistent format to enable an informed vote via AHP to determine the 
preferred C2 option. Once the participants used the AHP tool to conduct personal pair-wise 
comparisons, the plenary facilitator displayed the results in two groups—FOGO and general 
participants—as a means to stimulate discussion, which was captured using the Web-IQ 
threaded-discussion tool. 
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SUMMARY OF GAME PLAY 
Option A: Domain CDR Model 
Overview  
This model uses domains (maritime, air, land, space, and cyber) as its organizing principle. 
Domain Commanders are responsible for gaining, maintaining, and exploiting access within the 
assigned domain and denying the enemy from doing the same. They also exercise Operational 
Control over joint and combined forces rather than relying on support relationships between 
functional components. 
Force is allocated based on the anticipated need to project power through given domains, the 
threats to forces operating in those domains, and the need to disrupt, destroy or defeat those same 
domain threats. XDO Centers with each Domain Commander use Integrated Tasking Orders to 
provide direction to subordinate Combined Joint Task Units (CJTU) and control/coordinating 
instructions for CJTUs from other domain commanders which are operating in the same physical 
domain (e.g., airspace deconfliction, water space management, fire control measures, etc.). 
The CJTU is a tailored, combined-arms, joint force which includes coalition forces and has either 
a mission or geographic orientation. This organization enables self-synchronization within the 
close fight in a degraded communications environment. 
Organizational Philosophy 
Domains are the organizing principle for this system. Domain commanders seek to gain, 
maintain, and exploit access within their assigned domain and deny the enemy from doing the 
same. This may include taking action in other domains with attached forces for the purpose of 
affecting the assigned domain. Domain Commanders exercise OPCON over joint, combined 
forces rather than relying on support relationships between functional components. This may 
enhance the combined forces’ ability to gain more responsive, flexible, and integrated use of the 
full spectrum of military capabilities. The A2/AD challenge is expressed in terms of risk to own 
force while attempting to operate within a given domain. Degrading the commander’s ability to 
control forces will be part of an adversary’s A2/AD strategy. The Domain approach puts the C2 
solution into the same terms as the A2/AD problem. 
The Defense Strategic Guidance and the Joint Operational Access Concept acknowledge that 
rolling back the A2/AD threat, peeling the threats back layer by layer, will be too costly in terms 
of time and treasure. Rather, domain access must be managed according to time, space, and force 
requirements, as well as leveraging access opportunities—along with low signature forces—in 
one domain to reduce risk and create opportunities in other domains. By Domain Commanders 
actively managing domains rather than managing the force through Functional Component 
Commanders, the CJTF maximizes his freedom of action. 
The primary features of this domain-centric approach are the CJTF XDO Command Board, 
Domain Task Group Commanders, associated Cross-Domain Operations Centers (XDO 
Centers), and the subordinate Combined Joint Task Units (CJTUs). The commanders employ 
mission-type orders issuing priorities, engagement authorities, and terms of reference on how 
subordinate units are authorized to employ assigned forces, along with expectations for mutual 
support. 
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Force is allocated based on the anticipated need to project power through given domains, the 
threats to forces operating in those domains, and the need to disrupt, destroy or defeat those same 
domain threats. As such, the majority of forces allocated to a given domain will most likely be 
optimized to operate in that domain (e.g. naval forces will be assigned to the Maritime Domain 
TG). However, the remaining balance of force for a given Task Group (TG) will likely include 
forces traditionally associated with other services that operate in different domains (e.g., the 
Maritime Domain TG CDR may have attached a land-based artillery battery to counter coastal 
defense cruise missile launchers). This occurs only when those forces are determined to be most 
effective at countering threats to the assigned domain and best employed under that domain 
commander. 
Structure 
The CJTF, located at the Tier II level, has OPCON of all assigned and attached forces. The CJTF 
has broad responsibility for managing the campaign and cross-domain planning, including the 
initial allocation of forces to the Domain TG CDRs. Domain TG CDRs then form JTUs, 
establish authorities for support relationships, and ensure forces are trained and ready for the 
Domain TGs and CJTUs. The XDO Command Board is the primary coordination mechanism 
between the Domain TG XDO Centers and is responsible for target and critical asset 
prioritization and apportionment, as well as force re-allocation when necessary. A Joint 
Intelligence Support Element (JISE) arranges intelligence functions at the Tier II level and 
coordinates Tier III intelligence activities. Task force sustainment functions are managed through 
several centers and boards to include the following: CJTF Joint Logistics Operations Center 
(JLOC), Joint Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (JDDOC), the Daily 
Logistics/Movement Coordination Board (L/MCB), and the Joint Movement Center (JMC). 
The Tier III level is divided into domain-based task groups—Maritime TG CDR, Air TG CDR, 
Land TG CDR, Cyber TG CDR, and the Space TG CDR. The Domain TG CDRs will define the 
CJTU’s access requirements, and projection or protection (IAMD) objectives with mission-type 
orders. The Domain TG CDRs’ XDO Centers provide resiliency through a matrix’d 
organizational structure of command (e.g., vertical) and control (e.g., horizontal). Domain TG 
CDRs are primarily responsible for managing their respective domains by working to lower risk 
in their assigned domain in order to accomplish the CJTF campaign plan. Domain commanders 
allocate forces between CJTUs; nominate, assign, and assess targets; and support intelligence 
functions. 
The CJTU, located at the Tier IV level, is a tailored, joint force which includes allied forces. The 
CJTU structure strives to maximize simplicity at the tactical level. Organizing the CJTUs by 
mission or geography and directly coordinating with each other may allow them to self-
synchronize in the close fight with degraded communications. CJTUs are pre-integrated through 
training and are allocated sufficient force to fulfill the majority of the CJTF’s campaign 
objectives. As previously noted, Domain Commanders have the majority of the forces that they 
require to achieve their end state, with minimal reallocation of forces required. Figure 9 provides 
a graphical depiction of Team A’s final C2 structure. 
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Figure 9: Team A Final C2 Structure 
Targeting Process 
Potential targets are identified, researched, developed, vetted, and validated, after which they are 
nominated to the CJTF’s Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB). The Joint Targeting 
Working Group (JTWG) builds a draft Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List (JIPTL). Targets 
are then prioritized and apportioned among domain commanders according to force capability, 
target types, geographical separation, mission alignment, risk, and other relevant factors. 
After Domain TG CDRs assemble data on the current status (capability and availability) of 
friendly forces and munitions, they assign forces, munitions, and nonlethal capabilities to 
specific targets and aim points. Upon receipt of tasking orders, detailed planning is carried out at 
the CJTU level for operations against both deliberate and dynamic targets. The CJTF XDO 
Center and Domain XDO Centers coordinate to prioritize, assign, and deconflict force execution 
against critical, time-sensitive dynamic targets. Rapid re-tasking of assets is facilitated by the 
cognizant XDO Centers when one Domain TG CDR needs support from another. 
Targeting assessments flow up from CJTUs to the Domain TG CDRs, who evaluates access and 
projection effectiveness for their respective domains. The CJTF then aggregates and evaluates 
domain assessments to provide a clear picture of effects achieved, priority targets not engaged, 
and the overall progress of the campaign. 
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Intelligence Process 
Planning and direction of intelligence functions and collections efforts are focused at the CJTF 
staff and the JISE. Within the JISE, the Collections Operations Cell chairs the daily Domain 
Collections Working Group and participates in the daily Joint Collections Management Board at 
the GCC level. The Collections Operations Cell (COC) drafts the daily collections tasking order 
for dissemination to Domain TG CDRs’ staffs for execution while concurrently monitoring the 
status of ongoing collections’ efforts. The COC has the ability to direct dynamic re-tasking of 
assets if required by the CJTF. The JISE is co-located with JTCB and JTWG. This integration of 
operations and intelligence better informs the CJTF staff and supports effective tasking of 
Domain TG CDRs. 
Processing, Exploitation, Analysis, Production, Dissemination and Integration (PEAPDI) is 
performed concurrently by the CJTF CDRs and Domain TG CDRs. This effort aims to build the 
tactical and common intelligence pictures. Target assignment and assessment is also performed 
at the Tier III level with close support from the various intelligence functions. 
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Process 
The CJTF staff prioritizes, apportions, and allocates defensive IAMD resources. Critical asset 
nominations are prioritized by the XDO Board—chaired by the CJTF Deputy CDR—through the 
Criticality, Vulnerability and Threat (CVT) assessment process. The final Critical Asset List 
(CAL) is submitted to the CJTF CDR for approval. Once approved, the CAL is returned to the 
XDO Board for resource allocation. The Air Domain TG CDR is designated as the Area Air 
Defense Commander (AADC) with overall responsibility for executing IAMD at the Tier III 
level. As the AADC, the Air Domain TG CDR synchronizes IAMD across domains through the 
XDO Centers and assesses readiness of defensive units. 
The IAMD CJTUs under each domain direct defensive actions for tactical execution of IAMD, 
and are in direct support of the AADC. To enable efficient tactical level performance across 
domains, the establishment of AMD cells at the CJTUs is employed to prevent fratricide, provide 
defense in depth, and deconflict fires between weapons systems. Maritime, Land and Air 
Domain CJTUs are delegated additional responsibilities as Sector Air Defense Commanders 
(SADCs). Cyber and Space CJTUs have IAMD cells (without the SADC designation) to ensure 
complete synergy and integration among all domains. 
Sustainment Process 
Due to the joint nature of the CJTU and the wide distribution of logistical assets between 
Domain TGs, sustainment processes are centralized at the CJTF staff, with organic supply and 
maintenance forces at the CJTU level. The CJTF Joint Logistics Operations Center (JLOC) 
coordinates and synchronizes logistic operations such as engineering, contracting, materiel 
readiness, mortuary affairs and host nation support. The CJTF’s Joint Deployment and 
Distribution Operations Center (JDDOC) optimizes inter-theater and theater deployment, 
distribution, and sustainment operations. The Daily Logistics and Movement Coordination Board 
(LMCB) manage these functions to provide guidance, policies and priorities to the CJTF CDR. 
The Joint Movement Center (JMC) coordinates the employment of all means of transportation 
(including allies/Host Nation) to help execute the mission. 
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Coalition Integration 
Assuming coalition governments fully support participation of their military forces in potential 
operations, coalition forces are integrated directly within the domain task groups to the greatest 
extent possible. All coalition partners retain national command of their forces, with national 
commanders residing within the CJTF. Coalition partners will transfer operational control to the 
CJTF, with the caveat that some coalition forces may be constrained by national ROE. A 
coalition officer could serve as the Deputy CDR of the Domain TG when coalition forces reside 
within that domain task group. 
Sustainment and logistics remains a national responsibility. Sustainment and logistics will be 
provided under extant acquisition and cross-servicing agreements, with the CJTF theatre logistics 
commander (J4) responsible for prioritization and delivery. Integration of coalition intelligence 
capabilities will be driven by access controls and system interoperability. While unique 
collections capabilities provided by coalition partners can provide increased access and 
situational awareness, tasking ISR assets may be problematic across the coalition due to 
limitations imposed by national laws and restrictions. 
Space Integration 
U.S. Strategic Command’s Joint Force Component Commander for Space (USSTRATCOM 
JFCC-Space) is dual-hatted as the CJTF’s Space Domain TG CDR. This CDR remains OPCON 
to USSTRATCOM, and serves in direct support of the CJTF CDR. The GCC/CJTF may delegate 
TACON of specific CJTU forces to the Space Domain TG CDR to gain and maintain space 
superiority when and where required for the CJTF. Delegation may not include all required 
capabilities, which can be acquired through mutual support from other Domain TG CDRs as 
required. 
The Joint Space Operations Center (JSPOC) at Vandenberg AFB, CA, is the control center for 
the JFCC-Space and is designated the Space Domain Operations Center (SDOC) for a given 
CJTF. Additional manpower can be provided as required to aid command and control of any 
attached CJTUs. SDOC will produce a Space Integrated Tasking Order that incorporates Domain 
Support Requests (DSRs) and Domain Control Requests (DCRs) to command assigned and 
attached forces and coordinate space operations. 
Cyber Integration 
Cyber Domain TG CDR operates in-theater as a dedicated asset to the CJTF CDR and 
commands those cyber forces that are prioritized to support the local conflict. U.S. Cyber 
Command (USCYBERCOM) directly supports the Cyber TG CDR by quickly providing cyber 
assets which are not located in theater to the Cyber Domain TG CDR. USCYBERCOM retains 
the authority for striking targets outside of the joint operating area. Cyber forces are attached 
OPCON to the Cyber Domain TG CDR to provide in-JOA offensive non-kinetic fires, with 
forces from other domains attached as necessary to accomplish cyber effects. Additional domain 
support beyond attached capabilities is requested through the Cyber XDO Center. The mutual 
support relationship engendered by the XDO Centers supports synergistic effects for access or 
force projection in other domains. 
Authorities to use offensive cyber operations and prepare the operational environment are pushed 
down to Tiers III and IV, much like Defensive Cyber Operations. The Cyber Domain TG CDR 
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owns, operates, maintains, and defends all networks in theater with attached assets and may 
request unique Cyber Protection Teams (CPTs) and capabilities from other GCCs and 
CYBERCOM, as required. 
Figure 10 provides a graphical representation of Team A’s final C2 system, consisting of both 
structure and assigned processes. 
 
Figure 10: Team A Final C2 System (Structure and Processes) 
Team A Strengths and Weaknesses Summary 
The strengths and weaknesses identified by Team A for their resulting C2 system are 
summarized in Table 3. 
Option B: Cross-Domain CDR (XDC) Model 
Overview  
This system is designed around XDO that incorporates maximum redundancy for an anticipated 
highly contested future environment. The Cross-Domain model focuses on organizing joint 
effects under commands subordinate to the CJTF that are precisely tailored to the Theatre 
Campaign Plan. Known as “Cross-Domain Commanders” (XDCs), each Tier III headquarters 
controls an array of joint capabilities and operates much like a mini-CJTF, focused on a specific 
line of operation as prescribed in the campaign plan. 




Strengths: CJTF CDR vertically aligns all tasks via the XDO Board and horizontally coordinates 
via the XDO Centers. When able, tasks can be assigned to a single Domain TG CDR with 
sufficient autonomy to independently accomplish objective while remaining aligned with CJTF 
intent. Centralization of sustainment functions at CJTF staff improves efficiency. 
 
Weaknesses: Unity of effort may break down along domain lines unless domain definitions are 
clear, and Low Density/High Demand capabilities must be carefully managed between domain 
TGs to prevent dilution of effort. 
Flexibility 
Strengths: Domain construct allows expansion/contraction of mission, resources, and areas as 
necessary. Support relationships and procedures have been designed such that info can be 
passed quickly and force allocation can be updated quickly. 
 
Weakness: Mutual support relationships may not be sufficiently nimble to be effective in a 
dynamic environment. 
Simplicity 
Strength: Access and projection requirements are easily mapped to Domain Commanders. 
 
Weakness: Simplicity is degraded with the expansion of the conflict and overlap in CJTU areas of 
operation. The subsequent difficulty in coordination across domain lines could result in confusion 
and redundancy of tasks between domains. 
Resiliency 
Strength: Pre- integration and training of the CJTUs in the execution of mission-type orders—
coordinated via the XDO Centers—provide a high degree of resiliency. 
 
Weaknesses: Close dependency on the XDO Centers for all coordination could prove problematic 
over time in a communications degraded environment; centralization of multiple 




Strengths: CJTU structure primarily encourages coordinated, high tempo, combined joint action at 
the lowest possible level using mission type orders, with secondary and tertiary integration 
accomplished via the XDO Centers and XDO Board respectively. 
 
Weakness: Geographic overlap, along with broad span of control within each domain, may hinder 
operational integration and will require deconfliction at the Tier III-IV levels, which may be difficult 




Strengths: The XDO Center and Command Board is focused on XDO synergy and is structured to 
provide effective targeting and force allocation. Further support between Domain CDRs is enabled 
through mutual support relationships. 
 
Weakness: For the XDO Board to be effective there must be a shared situational awareness 
regarding domain risk levels to determine which domain should be leveraged to compensate for 
vulnerabilities in other domains and achieve the desired effects. 
Table 3: Team A Strengths and Weaknesses Summary 
Organizational Philosophy 
The independent nature of each XDC allows them to operate autonomously, limited only by the 
extent of their authority and the capabilities of their assigned forces. Individual XDCs are able to task 
and organize their forces as required in response to changing missions and lines of operation. All 
forces are either assigned OPCON to XDC Task Forces (TFs) or available for tasking directly by the 
CJTF CDR. Additional theater assets or assets from outside the joint operating area (JOA) are 
assigned TACON to the XDC as needed. Shifting the TACON of units among XDCs, as the 
situation dictates, allows for enhanced flexibility in the C2 system as the campaign unfolds and 
operational requirements change. To facilitate redundancy and ensure resilient operations in a 
communications challenged environment, this system relies on functions and processes being 
commanded and accomplished at the lowest possible level in the overall organization. 
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Consequently, the task units located at the Tier IV level are predominately joint and cross-domain in 
nature. Because of the broad spectrum of capabilities under the control of each XDC, staff officers 
will require a level of joint education and training far above today’s standards. This structure is a 
significant departure from current C2 doctrine and challenges existing doctrinal paradigms. For 
example, the functions of a Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) are split among three 
organizations at two tiers of command. Provided communications can be maintained, a normal ATO 
cycle is possible. But in a degraded environment, the principles of mission command become 
paramount, and Cross-Domain Commanders would operate independently following existing 
commander’s intent using predetermined methods of deconfliction. 
Structure 
This construct is heavily influenced by the lines of operation prescribed by the theatre campaign 
plan, with an XDC responsible for an entire Line of Operation. Each XDC must understand 
higher headquarters intent and mission orders with sufficiently clarity to operate independently 
and absent additional guidance, if required. In a communications-challenged environment, this 
structure relies heavily on the mutual support relationship among XDCs and assumes a high level 
of coordination and collaboration at that level. As the environment becomes more permissive and 
the CJTF commander’s span of control becomes more manageable, the CJTF CDR may assume 
a greater role directing actions between the XDCs. 
In response to the scenario and associated vignettes, three Tier III XDC organizations were 
developed: XDC Offense, XDC Defense, and Task Force Sustainment. XDC Offense conducts all 
offensive operations including those offensive actions required to support XDC Defense and TF 
Sustainment. XDC Offense is not constrained by geography and has OPCON of all assigned forces. 
The XDC Offense Commander may delegate TACON to other XDCs as appropriate. XDC Defense 
is responsible for conducting defensive operations within the assigned Joint Operational Area, 
including integrated air and missile defense. Task Force Sustainment is a joint logistics command 
formed to ensure efficient, flexible sustainment and medical support to Blue operational forces. 
Each XDC headquarters features a Cross-Domain Operations and Intelligence Center (XDO/IC) to 
coordinate activities among XDC’s and synchronizes with the XDO Board at the CJTF level when 
possible. Moreover, individual XDCs are empowered to task and organize their forces as required in 
response to changing missions and lines of operation ordered by the CJTF. All forces are either 
assigned OPCON to XDCs/TFs or available for tasking directly by the CJTF. Additional assets—
either based in-theater or outside the JOA (OJOA)—would be assigned TACON to an XDC as 
needed. Shifting TACON of units between XDCs as the situation dictates allows flexibility as the 
campaign unfolds and operational requirements dictate. With the additional command layer of the 
XDCs, this model may appear more complex than necessary. However, this complexity is mitigated 
by the flexibility and simplicity inherent in the OPCON relationships that characterize this structure, 
along with the resiliency provided by multiple CJTF-like organizations subordinate to the CJTF 
CDR. Figure 11 provides a graphical depiction of Team B’s final C2 structure. 
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Figure 11: Team B Final C2 Structure 
Targeting Process 
Target nomination and prioritization for lethal and non-lethal fires and effects occurs at all 
levels. The CJTF staff develops the Joint and Restricted Target Lists, with input and 
recommended priorities from the XDCs and their subordinate commanders. The CJTF staff 
manages the Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List (JIPTL) through an organization known as 
the XDO Board. The XDO Board functions as a Joint Target Coordination Board (JTCB), 
though now expanded to include all domains. With its proximity to the CJTF Commander, the 
XDO Board can quickly make apportionment decisions that reflect the latest intent and priorities. 
The CJTF CDR apportions and assigns targets among XDCs and subordinate forces according to 
their mission alignment, force capability, target types, and other relevant factors. XDCs then 
assign targets to Tier IV force commanders for mission planning and execution. For dynamic 
targets, the CJTF CDR—with input from the XDCs—defines & validates target types, criteria, 
and engagement authorities. XDCs have overall responsibility for time sensitive target execution, 
coordination and deconfliction, while tier IV forces execute the missions, thereby enabling 
operations in a communications-denied environment. 
As with target nomination and prioritization, target assessment occurs at all levels. The CJTF 
staff has overall target assessment responsibility and leverages GCC and Intelligence 
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Community resources, as well as Targeting Assessment reports from XDCs and Tier IV 
commanders to provide a holistic assessment of kinetic and non-kinetic targeting effectiveness. 
Intelligence Process 
Intelligence organizations and tailored intelligence support will occur at all levels of the system. 
Intelligence personnel are embedded into each cross-domain headquarters, in the form of a Joint 
Intelligence Support Element (JISE). All units retain their organic intelligence personnel to the 
maximum extent possible. Planning and direction (guidance) in the form of an OPS/ISR strategy 
will flow downward. The intelligence processes are assigned to specific levels to facilitate the 
development and maintenance of an intelligence common operating picture which will survive in 
a communications-degraded environment. Information requirements are generated at the lowest 
level, passed up echelon for validation, collection and exploitation. The dissemination of finished 
intelligence from the Intelligence Community (IC) and the CJTF CDR level will flow down to 
the XDCs and subordinate forces. This construct allows for the intelligence cycle to occur at the 
Tier IV level, should connectivity be lost with higher echelons. 
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Process 
The CJTF CDR retains authority and responsibility to manage the Critical Asset List (CAL) 
development process and allocation of IAMD resources through the Joint Theater Air and 
Missile Defense Working Group and Board. Authority is delegated to XDC Defense to manage 
the defense of those assets identified on the Defended Assets List (DAL), in addition to 
managing IAMD in the rear area battlespace. XDC Offense retains IAMD capabilities organic to 
its force and manages IAMD actions in the deep and close battlespace. XDCs coordinate IAMD 
priorities through the XDO/IC structures to ensure alignment and gain cross-domain synergy. 
Sustainment Process 
Theater sustainment is conducted through Task Force Sustainment, a Tier III joint logistics 
command formed to ensure efficient, flexible support and sustainment of forces; since service 
forces now are assigned to various XDCs, vice a single functional or service component 
commander. It works largely as a pass-through organization, and is designed to allow Service 
Component logistics organizations to execute sustainment. 
Task Force Sustainment plans, prioritizes, allocates, synchronizes, and coordinates sustainment 
requirements across services and XDCs. It coordinates with Defense Agencies (DLA, TRANSCOM) 
Coalition, and host nation support structures. Constantly assessing force requirements and supply 
status, it determines proper sources of supplies and maintenance and the means of distribution. Task 
Force Sustainment coordinates and executes all intra-theater transportation (Air, Sea, and Land) and 
provides C2 and coordination of Blue medical services. Logistics status and readiness are reported to 
the CJTF CDR and ultimately the GCC through the CJTF Sustainment Fusion Cell. Sustainment 
Forces include Service component operational sustainment forces, as well as intra-theater airlift, 
intra-theater sealift, air refueling tankers, and logistics helicopters. 
Coalition Integration 
Each coalition partner utilizes a national force provider to interface with the GCC to coordinate 
manning, training and equipping of their forces and to act as the conduit to their national 
command authority. Operational level force integration is achieved through coalition 
representatives in each XDC headquarters. 
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Space Integration 
JFCC—Space will provide reach-back support for the CJTF under a general support relationship 
and will be responsible for day-to-day planning and execution of space activities. 
Cyber Integration 
A Cyber Support Team (CST) is integrated at the CJTF CDR level to support the offensive and 
defensive cyber requirements of all XDCs. A Cyber Support Element (CSE) is attached to each 
XDC to conduct and integrate cyber planning, as well as prioritize cyber requirements. While the 
requirements for offensive cyber effects are generated by each XDC and their subordinate 
commanders, the actual offensive cyber operations are conducted by national organizations 
outside the theater. 
Figure 12 provides a graphical representation of Team B’s final C2 system, consisting of both 
structure and assigned processes. 
 
Figure 12: Team B Final C2 System (Structure and Processes)
U.S. Naval War College Global 2013 Report 
42 
Team B Strengths and Weaknesses Summary 
The strengths and weaknesses identified by Team B for their resulting C2 system are 





Strength: The structure allows for the formation/disestablishment of purpose-driven Tier 3 XDCs 
to achieve localized or relatively short-term campaign objectives. Allocation decisions are clearly 
tied to operational objectives simplifying priority and level of effort decisions in an asset 
constrained environment. This structure simplifies asset allocation under each XDC. 
 
Weakness: Shifting assets and coordinating tasks among XDCs may be difficult in a 
communications-denied environment. When disconnected from higher headquarters, XDCs may 
interpret intent and guidance differently, leading to inefficient use of assets that could be better 
employed by another XDC. 
Simplicity 
Strength: Each XDO has very clear and simple C2 lines to Tier IV forces. 
 
Weaknesses: Simplicity begins to break down when considering the roles and missions of each 
XDC. Geographic and mission responsibilities and authorities are not clearly delineated. This lack 
of clarity may lead to confusion at the Tier IV level. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that 
many capability areas are spread across multiple XDCs including Intelligence Community support, 
SOF and ISR. Dual role assets may not be used effectively because of difficulties in shifting 
control between XDCs. 
Resiliency 
Strengths: Each XDC has the C2, planning, and force capabilities required to operate semi-
autonomously, based on higher headquarters intent and guidance, when communications are 
disrupted. This independence also allows one XDC to accomplish tasks normally assigned to 
another if required. 
 
Weaknesses: Depending on how XDCs are aligned (assigned to LOOs) and the magnitude of the 
crisis, they may be faced with a large, disparate mission set across the entire battlespace. This 
wide span of control may become unmanageable. 
Operational 
Integration 
Strengths: This construct facilitates decentralized planning and execution and promotes the 
concentration of efforts. There is sufficient control to direct and coordinate distributed, 
synchronized operations. Target priorities are decided at the lowest level based on the overall 
CJTF CDR guidance. Supply and maintenance forces are centrally managed at the Tier III level 
by the TF Sustainment CDR, which should aid in theater planning and prioritization. 
 
Weaknesses: The XDC construct allows for the possibility of overlap and conflict among XDC 
operations. Air, Space, Cyber, Maritime, and SOF operate in 3 different environments; 
coordination, distribution, and synchronized operations are difficult across each line of operation 
depending on the daily weight of the main effort. Sustainment may be less efficient with centrally-




Strength: By designing each XDC as a mini-CJTF with the range of capabilities across domains to 
achieve its assigned objectives, cross-domain synergy is organic to the structure. 
 
Weakness: The independent nature of XDCs may lead to a breakdown in coordination and 
integration below the CJTF CDR level. This will have the greatest impact on capabilities like 
cyber, space operations, and ISR that must be shared by XDCs. 
Table 4: Team B Strengths and Weaknesses Summary 
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Option C: Functional CDR Model 
Overview 
This is an evolved functional command and control system with improved cross-domain 
operational effectiveness created by placing command authority for assigned joint forces at lower 
echelons in time and space, as limited by span of communications, for effective joint forces 
employment in a denied environment. Cross-domain effectiveness at the CJTF CDR and 
Functional Component CDR levels is improved by developing Cross-Domain Coordination 
Elements (XDCE) in each of these commands, and physically co-locating these commands to 
create and exploit deep, big-picture knowledge across all domains within the area of operations. 
Combined Joint Task Force Component Commanders (CJTFCCs) for Logistics and Sustainment 
additionally increase CJTF effectiveness. Evolutionary improvements in force integration and 
battlespace understanding across the CJTF increase operational tempo and effectiveness in a 
progressively demanding A2/AD environment. 
Organizational Philosophy 
This command and control system meets future area denial challenges by evolving from existing 
service-derived functional component commands within the CJTF to a system with additional 
capabilities to enable effectiveness in a communications-denied environment. 
The operational (CJTF) commander and the on-scene or mission commander integrating joint 
forces have different requirements. Examining command and control from the top down and 
from the bottom up simultaneously enabled a coordinated evolution of existing systems and 
processes to better meet the future requirements of all commanders in the CJTF. The evolved 
system sacrifices simplicity and flexibility relative to the criteria of unity of effort, resiliency, 
operational integration, and cross-domain synergy. The CJTF CDR and the component 
commanders must specify in advance the mission command, tasking and ‘contract’ orders that 
will be executed by an on-scene mission commander across a communications-limited span of 
control. The tactical command and control thus prescribed enables the mission commander to 
dynamically employ the full range of provided joint capabilities to best accomplish the mission. 
Four key characteristics illuminate this command and control system. First, the system is an 
evolutionary progression from existing military service-developed functional component 
commands. Second, functional logistics and information warfare component commands are 
added to expected legacy commands that include air, land and maritime components. Third, 
processes that enable a greater understanding, ‘deep’ and ‘wide’ across all the warfighting 
domains, are developed at every appropriate level of joint force integration within the CJTF. 
Fourth, processes to enable dynamic integration of joint forces by an on-scene or mission 
commander with a limited span of control are incorporated into this structure. Individually, these 
characteristics link to existing and legacy methods of operating within or across service cultures. 
Collectively, full incorporation within a CJTF structure represents a significant evolution of joint 
force capability within the most demanding expected operational environment. 
Existing service-led functional components are the basic building blocks of this command and 
control structure. This begins with the assignment of the CJTF commander based on the 
preponderance of assigned forces, nature of the mission and ability of the commander to exercise 
command and control. Functional component commanders for Land, Air, Maritime, Special 
U.S. Naval War College Global 2013 Report 
44 
Operations, Cyber and Space would then be assigned below the CJTF CDR echelon. Service 
components would be designated for each service providing forces to the CJTF. Building from 
these basic ‘blocks’ leverages the strengths of our existing service-centric military forces. 
Creation of a logistics component commander enables placement of assigned theater sustainment 
forces OPCON/TACON to this commander as required. Across a large area of operations, 
increased operational effectiveness will be obtained by assigning a peer logistics component 
commander co-equal to the warfighting commanders to provide additional focus and fidelity to 
logistics synchronization within campaign planning and execution. 
The information warfare component commander increases the operational effectiveness of the 
execution of the campaign plan by focusing kinetic and non-kinetic fires and all elements of 
information warfare under the umbrella of a single, focused functional commander. By 
conducting operations in the traditional domains of warfare as well as the space and cyber 
domains to interface with both the adversary’s fighting forces and civilian population, the 
Combined Joint Forces Information Warfare Component Commander and Space Control 
Authority (CJFIWCC/SCA) takes a holistic and focused approach to all elements of IW and 
improves the CJTF performance in this area. 
Cross-Domain Coordination Elements (XDCE) represent a revolutionary process within the 
command and control system. Appropriately scaled for each headquarters commanding and 
controlling joint forces, XDCEs create a deep, detailed knowledge and understanding of the 
battlespace across the operations area. This understanding must bring together enough data from 
the environment (e.g. “COP”) and add the wisdom (the “so what”) that exceptional operational 
commanders develop, and then needs to be rapidly disseminated throughout the CJTF.  
(Note: Some Global 2013 Capstone participants offered that a “combined arms 
approach” as practiced in some current headquarters already performs this process of 
developing cross- domain understanding. While these efforts should be applauded, 
they do not appear to be of the scope or scale required to achieve the requisite 
understanding and communicate it to the operating forces at a tempo that enables 
military success.) 
Structure 
This CJTF builds on current combined joint task force doctrine and practice. The CJTF 
command headquarters is a joint headquarters operating traditional Boards, Bureaus, Centers, 
Cells & Working Group (B2C2WG)-based processes. An intelligence JISE (Joint Intelligence 
Support Element); MNCE (Multi-National Command Element—command authority for 
coalition forces by country); and XDCE conduct additional key processes at the CJTF HQ. The 
CJTF CDR exercises OPCON of the following subordinate functional combined joint force 
component and service commands: Combined Joint Force Logistics Component Commander 
(CJFLOGCC), Combined Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (CJFMCC), Combined 
Joint Force Air Component Commander/Area Air Defense Commander (CJFACC/AADC), 
Combined Joint Force Land Component Commander (CJFLCC) Combined Joint Force Special 
Operations Component Commander (CJFSOCC), and the CJFIWCC/SCA, along with the Air 
Force service component commander (AFFOR). The CJTF will also have other command 
relationships with special operations, cyber, space and other forces, depending on the situation. 
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Forces are assigned or attached to service and component commanders. The CJFLOGCC 
exercises TACON over assigned logistics forces. The CJFMCC exercises OPCON over 
assigned USN and USMC forces and TACON over other coalition or service forces. The 
AFFOR exercises OPCON over USAF forces. The CJFACC/AADC exercises TACON over 
assigned U.S. and coalition forces. The CJFLCC exercises OPCON over USA forces and 
TACON over other assigned U.S. and coalition forces. The CJFSOCC is OPCON to the 
Theater Special Operations Command (T-SOC) and exercises TACON of SOF in support of 
CJTF missions. The CJFIWCC/SCA exercises OPCON or TACON of a variety of forces 
conducting CJTF missions. Across the CJTF, command relationships of OPCON and 
TACON are supplemented by supporting and supported relationships, and coordination 
authority is broadly distributed. 
Operations under this construct are enabled by prescriptive orders and instructions where 
required. The specific command authorities, role and responsibility assignments, and other rules 
required to enable necessary flexibility and responsiveness in the execution of joint force 
operations are determined and promulgated in advance through processes executed at the CJTF 
and Functional Component Headquarters. Figure 13 provides a graphical depiction of Team C’s 
final C2 structure. 
 
Figure 13: Team C Final C2 Structure 
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Targeting Process 
Prioritization of all targets occurs at the CJTF level to include guidance for the categorization of 
time sensitive targets (TSTs). The Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB) integrates and 
synchronizes all weapons systems and capabilities. The targeting assessment process is also 
conducted at the CJTF staff level and is used to measure progress of the joint force toward 
mission accomplishment. 
During execution, Component Commanders continually monitor progress toward accomplishing 
tasks, creating effects, and achieving objectives. Assessment actions and measures help 
commanders adjust operations and resources as required and make other decisions to ensure 
current and future operations remain aligned with the mission and desired end state. The JTF 
Commander’s intent, guidance and objectives are given to the Component Commanders to plan 
and execute. The Component Commanders then plan, prioritize, apportion and task their forces 
to conduct operations to achieve the JTF Commander’s objective. The component commanders 
then examine the targets and their vulnerability, allocate available forces, conduct weapon-target 
pairings, to include non-kinetic weapons, as appropriate, and task subordinate units as required. 
The Subordinate Commanders are responsible for the Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage & Assess 
( F2T2EA) process for both deliberate and dynamic targets. Upon receipt of tasking orders, the 
warfighter must perform detailed planning for combat operations, in a dynamic operational 
environment that changes as a result of actions from the joint force, adversary, while maintaining 
focus on the CJTF CDRs objectives. 
Subordinate commanders also conduct target assessment actions and measures, help 
commanders adjust operations and resources as required, and make other decisions to ensure 
current and future operations remain aligned with the mission and desired end state. 
Intelligence Process 
GCC Joint Intel Ops Center provides analytical production support, oversees the development 
and prioritization of collection requirements from Tier IV up to the GCC and leverages the 
national Intelligence Community (IC) to support CJTF requirements. The CJTF J2 plans and 
directs intelligence support and collection requirements in support of the CJTF CDR’s Priority 
Intel Requirements (PIRs). The CJTF-embedded JISE develops overall situational awareness and 
provides joint cross-domain intelligence support via low bandwidth, coalition releasable “smart 
push” support to lower echelon forces. Components execute collections operations management 
over assigned forces and provide processing and exploitation of raw intelligence from organic 
collection platforms. Service units provide processing and exploitation of raw intelligence from 
organic collection platforms as well as collection from service forces. 
IAMD Process 
Prioritization of critical assets must happen at the theater level because those critical assets are 
shared resources. In response to the challenges posed by the Capstone scenario and associated 
vignettes, a Battle Management Area (BMA) was designated within the JOA and was assigned to 
a Tier IV JTF subordinate to the CJFMCC. This subordinate JTF would be task-organized, 
composed of various cross-domain assets, and would be constrained either temporally or 
geographically. Due to the authorities delegated to the commander of this subordinate JTF, they 
must be assigned by the CJTF CDR directly. 
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Allocation of Defensive Resources—Campaign allocation of resources will rest with the 
CJTF CDR, based on advice from his co-located component commanders. An Assessment of 
Defensive Readiness would be produced by the CJFACC/AADC, and would be a collation of 
the component commander and subordinate command inputs in accordance with the normal 
battle rhythm (Since the AFFOR is not an operational commander, they would not assess 
defensive readiness). Based on the results of the assessment, the CJTF CDR may recommend 
to the GCC a reprioritization of critical assets. To be effective, however, the actual battle 
management must be pushed to the lowest level. Logistics, Regionally Aligned Forces 
(RAF), and cyber units do not direct defensive actions due to the fact that their IAMD 
defense is provided by other units. 
Sustainment Process 
Resource providers plan, program and acquire logistics resources and position in accordance 
with phase zero plans. When an operation occurs and a CJTF is stood up, requirements in 
addition to these resources will be developed by the CJTF J4 (or Joint Deployment and 
Distribution Operations Center (JDDOC), if established) and presented to the GCC for 
sourcing. 
The CJTF J4 (or JDDOC) will synchronize and optimize inter-theater and theater deployment, 
distribution, and sustainment operations within a GCC’s AOR. The CJTF staff will allocate and 
prioritize supply, repair and maintenance services provided for this operation. The CJTF staff 
will integrate logistics operations and operate a fusion center (movement control organization), 
acting in consonance with the GCC’s overall requirements and priorities. Acting on behalf of the 
GCC, The CJTF staff may direct common user and intra-theater distribution solutions. 
The CJFLOGCC is established to direct all elements of the supply & maintenance systems in 
order to deliver the “right things” to the “right place” at the “right time” to support the joint force 
commander and component commanders. The CJFLOGCC must determine the proper balance of 
efficiency and effectiveness in distribution processes being executed, and remain flexible to 
employ new methods as the environment changes. The other component commanders are 
responsible for assessing the effectiveness of repair, maintenance and supply. Units are 
responsible for identifying logistical requirements and reporting readiness up the chain of 
command. 
Coalition Integration 
Assuming coalition governments fully support participation of their military forces in potential 
operations, coalition forces are integrated directly within task groups to the greatest extent 
possible. All coalition partners retain national command of their forces, with national 
commander’s resident within the MNCE (Multi-National Command Element), by nation, at the 
CJTF HQ. Coalition partners will transfer operational control (OPCON) to the CJTF, but 
coalition forces are constrained by national ROE. Sustainment and logistics remain national 
responsibilities. Sustainment and logistics will be provided under extant acquisition and cross- 
servicing agreements, with the CJFLOGCC responsible for prioritization and delivery when 
supporting coalition forces. 
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Space Integration 
STRATCOM’s CDR JFCC-Space is dual-hatted as the GCC’s Space Component Commander. 
JFCC-Space remains OPCON to USSTRATCOM, and is in direct support to the CJFIWCC/SCA. 
JFCC-Space may attach forces TACON to the CJFIWCC/SCA to gain and maintain space 
superiority when and where required. Additional capabilities required to accomplish CJFIWCC/SCA 
space missions will be assigned OPCON, TACON or in a support relationship. 
Cyber Integration 
CJFIWCC/SCA conducts offensive and defensive cyber operations as the information warfare 
commander for the CJTF. Cyber, Space, communication and IW units will be assigned OPCON, 
TACON or in support of the CJFIWCC/SCA as appropriate. CYBERCOM is in direct support to 
the CJFIWCC/SCA to provide cyber assets that are not in theater in a timely manner. 
CYBERCOM retains the authority for striking OJOA targets with Cyber capabilities. The 
CJFIWCC/SCA, as the information warfare commander, takes a broad look at IW operations 
across the joint operating area and fully integrates offensive and defensive cyber capabilities 
across the combined and joint force to ensure that cyber supports gaining and maintaining access 
in all domains, as required. 
Figure 14 provides a graphical representation of Team C’s final C2 system, consisting of both 
structure and assigned processes. 
 
Figure 14: Team C Final C2 System (Structure and Processes) 
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Team C Strengths and Weaknesses Summary 
The strengths and weaknesses identified by Team C for their resulting C2 system are 
summarized in Table 5 below. 
Unity of 
Effort 
Strengths: Effective task organization allows for focused mission execution of CJTF CDRs intent 
in relation to campaign objectives, enabling effective C2 across the functional components, 
thereby maximizing coalition cohesion. CJFIWCC provides a single component CDR responsible 
for communications and use of the electromagnetic spectrum. 
 
Weaknesses: Approval authority still resides within a parallel command structure, which limits the 
CJTF CDR’s ability to direct operations across all the domains. This impacts IAMD dynamic 
targeting, which is split between two Tier III commands and will therefore involve two separate 
methods for attacking the problem set. 
Flexibility 
Strengths: Co-location of Tier II CJTF CDR and Tier III Component CDRs maximizes speed and 
quality of decisions, as well as situational awareness. Subordinate-JTF C2 construct provides an 
adaptable structure for employing the BMA construct, thereby enabling cross-domain authority to 
execute the mission in an A2/AD environment. 
 
Weaknesses: Degraded communications may prevent required coordination between Tier II 
intelligence and targeting node and Tier III components. Process to utilize multi-mission assets 
from other functional components and to dynamically shift missions between components is 
unclear. 
Simplicity 
Strengths: Alignment with current functional/service component structure enables service-level 
training and service-sponsored C2 systems/organizational structure to seamlessly support CJTF 
construct. 
 
Weaknesses: Lacks simplicity due to too many required lines of coordination. BMA assignment 
creates multiple geographic boundaries, which increases complexity in execution. 
Resiliency 
Strength: Creation of CJFLOGCC and retention of Coalition and Joint component commands 
increases resiliency and resource sustainability for the campaign. 
 
Weaknesses: Highly vulnerable to degraded communications, since stove-piped functional 
component CDRs rely on coordinating, deconflicting and synchronizing movements and actions 
with the CJTF CDR and other component CDRs. Co-locating all component CDRs and 




Strength: Capabilities and command authorities are jointly represented at the lowest level of 
command (in the case of the subordinate JTF construct) 
 
Weaknesses: This C2 model discourages XDO solutions, as Tier III units are likely to look to solve 
their problems predominately with their allocated forces. Having CYBERCOM and JFCC Space 
retain OPCON of the Joint Space Task Force (JS TF) and the Cyber Task Force (Cyber TF) at the 
Tier IV level will cause chain of command problems, as well as conflicting C2 issues. This system 
is not capable of coordinating high tempo, distributed ops across a large JOA. Coordination of 
different types of forces is held at the Tier III - vice Tier IV - level, which will hinder the rapid and 




Strengths: Co-location of Tier II CJTF CDR and Tier III component CDRs optimizes mission 
execution and synchronizes the multiple service and coalition components. 
 
Weaknesses: Tasking processes inhibit cross-domain synergy at the Tier IV level. A dogmatic 
overreliance on doctrine will degrade C2 effectiveness. Difficult to direct (Tier II) and coordinate 
(Tier III/IV) kinetic and cyber/space ops in time and space in a communications-degraded 
environment. This C2 structure is essentially the same as what we utilize now. Each Tier III 
commander owns and fights only with forces that operate in each individual domain—with the 
occasional TACON shift when required. 
Table 5: Team C Strengths and Weaknesses Summary 
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C2 OPTIONS ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Participants used AHP to weight the six criteria for assessing the overall performance of a cross-
domain command and control system that operates in high intensity A2/AD environment. The 
aggregate responses of the twenty-one flag and general officers (black) were sub-divided into 3 
cohorts: USN FLAG (blue); US GENERAL (USAF, USMC, and USA; in red); and COALTION 
FOGO (green). All non-FOGO participants, including non-FOGO coalition participants, are 
depicted in purple. Figure 15 depicts the how each cohort assessed the importance of the six 
criteria relative to each other. 
 
Figure 15: Cohort Weighting Criteria Profiles 
When interpreting the results of Figure 15, the higher the peak, the more important that particular 
criterion was viewed by participants. The top three criteria for each cohort are indicated by the 
circled number. With the exception of the US GENERAL cohort, all participants assessed unity 
of effort, operational integration, and resiliency to be the top three most important criteria for 
maximizing the performance of a joint, cross-domain command and control system. In addition, 
the USN FLAG, COALTION FOGO and NON-FOGO PARTICIPANTS cohorts identified the 
same top three criteria and in the same relative order: 1) unity of effort, 2) operational 
integration, and 3) resiliency. 
Figure 16 depicts how each cohort assessed the resulting C2 systems, based on their weighting 
of the six criteria. The first row of bar graphs at the top of the image depict the overall 
preferences for Options A, B and C sorted by cohort. The ALL FOGO results, shown in black, 
are the mean of the consolidated USN FLAG (blue), US GENERAL (red), and COALITION 
FOGO (green) results. These results indicate no clear preference between the three options. 
The ALL FOGO cohort slightly preferred Option A, while the NON-FOGO PARTICIPANTS 
slightly preferred Option B. Among the FOGO cohorts, the USN FLAG group preferred 
Option C, the US GENERAL group preferred Option A, and the COALTION FOGO group 
preferred Option B. 
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Figure 16: Global ’13 C2 Options AHP Results 
The lower six plots show how each of the options scored by criterion and cohort. Data points 
which are close together indicate relatively similar scores between cohorts, while points which 
are farther apart show a divergence in scores. The flatter the line for a given cohort, the less 
variation (or differentiation) exists between option scores for that criterion. Analysis of the plots 
indicates the following: 
? Regarding the unity of effort criteria, the USN FLAG cohort rated Option C much 
higher than the other three cohorts. 
? Regarding the simplicity criteria, the COALITION FOGO cohort rated Option B much 
higher than the other three cohorts. 
? For the remaining four criteria (flexibility, resiliency, operational integration and cross-
domain synergy), the shape of the plots indicates relatively minor differences between 
the cohorts regarding the relative importance of the criteria and how they assessed the 
three C2 options at satisfying that criteria. 
Findings and Recommendations 
Enhancing Unity of Effort through Mission Command and Authorities 
Global ’13 described three distinct ways to command and control the joint force in a high 
intensity A2/AD environment. In all cases, the importance of Mission Command and pushing 
authorities and commander's intent to the lowest effective level (Tier IV) was emphasized as a 
way of mitigating the effects of communications challenges. In order for lower tier commanders 
to execute based on mission orders and intent, they must have the appropriate authorities to act. 
Therefore, commander’s intent and guidance must be provided—and authorities must be 
delegated—to the appropriate level before communications are interrupted. 
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The decentralized execution of military operations based upon mission orders is the core focus of 
Mission Command. Because communications challenges may force autonomous execution and 
decision making at lower levels, commanders will need the clarity of intent provided by mission 
orders. Mission orders must present a clear understanding of roles and missions among 
commanders at each level in the structure, along with the prioritization of the associated tasks 
and lines of effort. 
In order to ensure that all execution decisions and apportionment requests remain aligned with 
the operation's mission and commander's intent, the joint force must commit to a culture of 
leadership that relies on decentralization and trust. In order for tactical commanders to 
effectively execute their missions, they need clear commander’s intent and guidance. 
Conversely, senior commanders must trust that tactical commanders will appropriately interpret 
and act upon their guidance. Senior commanders must become comfortable with not being able 
to directly influence the outcome of a mission, but rather indirectly influencing outcomes by 
effectively enabling those subordinate commanders that are best-positioned to carry-out the fight. 
Cultivating trust and confidence between Senior Commanders and their subordinates will take 
time and require new ways of thinking about joint leadership, education and training. This trust 
must be earned through persistent engagement between leaders at all levels and a common 
commitment to changing the culture of joint command and control. A key part of commander’s 
intent and guidance is a clear understanding of the appropriate level of risk to assume. When 
tactical commanders are operating under mission command, they need to be able to quickly 
identify the likelihood that an event or action may occur and the potential impact it would have 
on mission accomplishment. Tactical commanders must not only know how much risk the 
commander is willing to accept, but they also must have a clear understanding of acceptable and 
unacceptable deviations from the intent and guidance provided. Once tactical leaders develop 
this understanding, they will need to practice it. This practice can come in various forms, such as 
gaming, simulations and real-world exercises. Pushing mission orders and authorities to the 
lowest levels succeeds in an environment where leaders at all levels value, encourage, and expect 
innovation, creativity and initiative. 
Revolutionary vs. Evolutionary  
Participants debated the merits of using a new approach (e.g., domain or cross-domain-based 
models) as opposed to revising today’s functional component model. Concepts such as 
"Domain" and "XDO" need to be better defined and understood across the force before a shift in 
operational C2 can occur. Participants appeared reluctant to commit to any change that was 
radically different than what is in place today. While still realizing the benefits and strengths of 
the three models, changes to current C2 structures and processes would have to occur at a 
deliberate and moderate pace. This assertion was communicated by the vast majority of U.S. and 
coalition participants. 
Coalition representatives highlighted that clear commander’s intent and guidance and pushing 
mission orders down to the lowest echelon would improve coalition integration. They also 
indicated that the pace and extent of change must be tempered and conducted in a way that 
enables coalition forces to operationally integrate. As one Coalition Flag Officer said, “If you go 
evolutionary, then we can follow. Revolutionary, we can’t follow.” 
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Regardless of the pace and extent of changes to current C2 systems, players recognized that 
integrating the characteristics of any XDO C2 system into today’s model would require new 
ways of thinking about warfare and breaking down service-specific culture barriers. This 
realization may be best characterized by the following player comment:  
“I think that while it is natural to try to keep a structure with which we are 
comfortable, a paradigm shift in approach is required and we should not be trying to 
keep elements of what we have or do but rather start with the blank sheet of paper 
which appears to have been the case in Option B. We must guard against being 
'prisoners of our own experience’.” 
No one C2 system developed during the game out-performed another. This was mainly because 
the game was designed to develop and refine each C2 system on its own. Results from AHP and 
qualitative analysis yield no clear preference among the three options. Achieving an optimal C2 
system will require a long-term dedicated effort that constantly examines and informs current 
doctrine and policy. The future C2 system would most likely consist of integrating emerging key 
concepts derived from the project with that of today’s C2 systems. XDO Centers, Information 
Warfare and Sustainment Commanders, as well as Joint Task Units are four key emerging 
concepts that could be integrated into today’s C2 architecture. These four concepts, along with 
other emerging characteristics of any XDO C2 system, are described later in the report. 
Degraded Communications Environment 
While reliable communication among forces that operate in different domains will be 
exceptionally difficult, it can be critical to achieving synergistic effects. Forces operating in 
different domains may be widely distributed as a protective measure or simply due to their 
operational characteristics. For example, aircraft, SOF, and submarines could be tasked to 
destroy elements of the coastal defense cruise missile kill chain to reduce risk in the maritime 
domain. Cross-domain operations also rely on communication to permit a higher degree of 
shared situational awareness, which provides an understanding of the risk associated with 
operations in each domain. This enables commanders to determine where domain access 
opportunities can be leveraged to create effects in other domains. If communication is disrupted, 
operational control may have to be assumed at lower echelon levels. 
Participants identified operations in a communications-degraded environment as a significant 
weakness across all three constructs. These weaknesses were described through the lens of each 
of the six C2 evaluation criteria. Players noted the importance of cross-domain planning at the 
lowest levels and the adoption of simplified C2 procedures as options to mitigate the effects of 
an environment where constant communications is not guaranteed. Problems may arise over 
target deconfliction, force allocation, and the tempo of operations. Any problems or 
inefficiencies caused by ambiguity in authority or unclear lines of control will be exacerbated by 
degraded or denied communications. Because of the relationship among Unity of Effort, 
Operational Integration, and Cross-Domain Synergy, any systemic deficiency caused by a 
communications-denied environment is likely to impact all three of these C2 attributes. 
Option B created multiple joint force commanders (the XDCs) that were subordinate to the 
CJTF. The use of multiple commanders could reduce the simplicity of the C2 system. However, 
participants highlighted elements that may allow the system to function in a communications-
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denied environment. Each XDC is essentially a mini joint task force with independent joint 
operational planning and execution capabilities across domains. With clear commander's intent, 
the XDCs may be able to conduct coherent operations independently, absent real-time 
communications with higher headquarters. 
Relying heavily on supported-supporting relationships to coordinate operations among functional 
components, Option C was criticized for its apparent lack of cross-domain synergy. Service and 
functional organizations are stove-piped, requiring lateral coordination lines that could be broken 
in a communications-degraded or denied environment. When communications are not available, 
the structure may lack the ability to plan and direct operations. If the CJTF and functional 
component headquarters cannot be co-located, integration of forces operating in different 
domains will occur on an ad-hoc basis at the CJTF located at Tier II level. The resulting 
integration may be insufficient to effectively direct operations in a high tempo, communications- 
denied environment. 
Domain Boundaries/Definitions 
There was broad consensus among the participants that clear domain definitions are required to 
support any C2 structure organized by individual domains. Unity of Effort, Cross-Domain 
Synergy, and Simplicity are the three attributes which are adversely impacted by the lack of clear 
definitions. While weaknesses caused by poorly defined domains were most associated with 
Option A, any construct where a commander is responsible for all operations in a domain or 
responsible for shaping a domain must have a clear definition of that domain that is understood 
and accepted by the entire chain of command. Current service definitions of the various domains 
have overlaps that would clearly cause confusion for commanders issuing orders and for tactical 
units attempting to operate from, create effects in, or even transit from one domain to another. 
Span of Control 
Participants identified a wide span of control at the Tier III level as a weakness in all three 
constructs. A wide span of control could impact a commander’s ability to effectively direct 
operations and could slow responsiveness during high tempo operations. The effect of a wide 
span of control was especially prevalent in Option B. The Tier III Offensive Cross-Domain 
Commander (XDC), responsible for offensive operations across the entire JOA and all domains, 
had almost the same span of control as the Tier II CJTF commander. This wide span of control 
could be mitigated by organizing XDCs by either geographic area or particular lines of 
operation. 
Attributes of an Effective Cross-Domain C2 System  
By analyzing player recommendations and stated strengths and weaknesses in the three systems 
that were considered, four attributes—A Cross-Domain Coordination/Control Element, an 
Information Warfare/Dominance Commander, a Sustainment Commander, and Combined Joint 
Task Units (CJTUs)—have emerged that could be included in future C2 systems to promote 
cross-domain synergy and unity of effort. A description of each is provided below. 
Cross-Domain Coordination/Control Element 
All three C2 models incorporated some form of a cross-domain coordination/control cell—or 
operations center—to synchronize effects and mitigate resource shortfalls at the Tier III level. 
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This feature was developed to enhance cross-domain synergy and operational integration. Team 
A used their XDO Centers, which resided within each Domain Commander’s headquarters, to 
produce Integrated Tasking Orders to provide direction to subordinate Combined Joint Task 
Units (CJTUs). They also provided control and coordinating instructions for CJTUs from other 
domain commanders that operated in the same physical domain (e.g., airspace deconfliction, 
water space management, fire control measures, etc.). Each XDO headquarters in Team B 
featured a Cross-Domain Operations and Intelligence Center (XDO/IC) to coordinate activities 
among XDO CDRs and synchronize with the XDO Board at the CJTF CDR level. Team C 
developed Cross-Domain Coordination Elements (XDCE) at the CJTF and functional component 
headquarters. These centers were physically co-located to create and exploit greater knowledge 
and understanding across all domains within the area of operations. 
Several comparisons were drawn to existing Army Battlefield Coordination Detachments and 
today’s use of liaison officers (LNOs). The staffs that would comprise these XDO Centers would 
include joint and international operators and planners that are educated and trained in planning 
and executing cross-domain operations. These centers would ultimately enhance the knowledge 
and awareness of access and power projection requirements, capabilities—and opportunities 
associated with each domain. As one player noted, “Until we all do alternate tours as airmen, 
sailors, soldiers, marines, cyber and logs specialists (and we would clearly never do it) we need 
to force together staffs—XDCE—that truly co-join their staffs to achieve coordinated effects.” 
Information Warfare/Dominance Commander 
The establishment of a commander responsible for information dominance was strongly 
supported by the participants. This standing organization would coordinate and integrate 
requirements and capabilities across the entire range of the information spectrum (cyber, space, 
EW, communications, intelligence, METOC, IO, etc.) in order to support commanders’ domain 
access and power projection requirements, push appropriate authorities down to the lowest 
levels, and better affect the internal workings (processes, biases, etc.) of an adversary’s C2 
system. This structure would be comprised of joint and international capabilities and staffs that 
train and exercise regularly. One flag officer noted, “The integrated information command from 
Team C is an important and novel idea and the information environment will be a key feature in 
emerging forms of warfare.” 
A commander responsible for information warfare would need to integrate its actions with the 
desired effects sought by each domain, cross-domain, or functional commander to obtain the 
cross-domain synergy required to support the CJTF CDR’s objectives in an A2/AD environment. 
This organization would need the communications capabilities to conduct real-time coordination 
among these commanders to reduce redundancies and overlaps, and ultimately synchronize 
effects across the fight. 
Sustainment Commander/Task Force Sustainment  
The sustainment of forces will be a major challenge to gaining a competitive advantage over a 
highly capable adversary. Traveling from long distances, these forces will be highly vulnerable 
to advanced adversary A2/AD systems. Any C2 structure must be able to accommodate the flow 
of forces deployed from the United States and throughout the region. The C2 systems developed 
over the course of the game highlighted some potential ways to plan and execute sustainment 
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operations in an A2/AD environment. A commander responsible solely for sustaining forces 
during the conflict emerged as one potential approach. Also referred to as Task Force 
Sustainment, this organization would be designed to help commanders (domain, cross-domain, 
or functional) achieve their objectives by coordinating and integrating requirements and 
capabilities across the joint force under the auspices of one commander. Such an approach could 
help synchronize logistics efforts and enhance unity of effort across the joint force. 
A standing joint sustainment command would provide several benefits to planning, directing, 
monitoring, and assessing the sustainment of forces in an A2/AD environment. As one 
participant noted, such an organization would direct all elements of the supply and maintenance 
system “to deliver the right things to the right place at the right time to support the joint force 
commander and component commanders.” The characteristics of this organization were 
compared to today’s Joint Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (JDDOC). The 
Sustainment Commander must determine the proper balance of efficiency and effectiveness in 
distribution processes being executed, and remain flexible to employ new methods as the 
environment changes. The other component commanders would be responsible for assessing the 
effectiveness of repair, maintenance and supply while joint task unit commanders would be 
responsible for identifying logistical requirements and reporting readiness up the chain of 
command. Aerial refueling, theater airlift, theater sealift, and ground transportation not organic 
to combat forces may be best aligned to TF Sustainment at the Tier III level, while control of 
low-density, high-demand capabilities may be best retained at the CJTF CDR/Tier II level. 
Combined Joint Task Units  
Participants in all three cells strongly supported the concept of projecting power through joint 
and/or combined commands below the Tier II/CJTF level which forces from different services 
that operate in different domains controlled through a combination of OPCON and TACON 
relationships. Participants pushed cross-domain command down the chain of command to 
enhance cross-domain synergy when communications prevented coordination across the battle 
space. Option A utilized Combined Joint Task Units (CJTUs) at the Tier IV level, subordinate to 
domain based commanders. Option B created Tier III Cross Doman Commanders (XDC) based 
on lines of operation. In Option C, they utilized mini-JTF’s at the Tier IV level, subordinate to a 
functional component commander. 
The CJTU is envisioned as a tailored, joint and coalition force, with capabilities from multiple 
domains. CJTUs can be assigned to any type of commander (domain, cross-domain, functional) 
within any type of C2 system. The CJTU structure embodies simplicity at the tactical level and 
maximizes operational integration and unity of effort across the C2 system. CJTUs could have 
mission or geographic orientations that allow them to self-synchronize and directly coordinate 
with each other in a degraded, denied, or hostile communications environment. CJTUs are pre-
integrated by training and allocated sufficient force to fulfill the majority of the CJTF’s 
campaign objectives. Specific commanders would be provided with the majority of the forces 
required to achieve their end state, with minimal reallocation of forces required. The make-up of 
these units drew comparisons from the participants to current Marine MAGTFs, Army Battalion 
Task Forces, and Navy Battle Groups. However, the tailored combination of multi-domain 
forces—to include cyber and space—is the fundamental difference between the CJTU and 
today’s service-specific task forces. 
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VI. Way Ahead 
Because an evolutionary approach was viewed as the preferred method for improving current C2 
structures and processes, Global 2014 will explore how the four emerging C2 attributes 
(information warfare/dominance commander, sustainment commander, cross-domain 
coordination and control element, and combined joint task units) derived from Global 2013 could 
be integrated into the current functional component model of today. This effort will entail 
developing a hybrid C2 model which incorporates these attributes, along with a supporting XDO 
C2 Concept of Operations (CONOPS), and to then examine and refine the CONOPS in order to 
lay the foundation for future Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) development.
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